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ABSTRACT 
 U.S. Army Special Forces are adept at accomplishing their core tasks, often 
within the cooperation and competition realms of the conflict continuum, and against 
less-than-peer adversaries. Their methods, skills, and capabilities may be insufficient to 
complete the same tasks against a peer competitor during armed conflict; some tasks may 
need to be accomplished differently, and new ones may need to be developed. As the 
Department of Defense re-directs its focus on great power competition in the midst of an 
increasingly complex operating environment, this study explores how Special Forces 
could contribute to defeating a great power adversary in large-scale combat operations 
between 2030–2050. After describing a future operating environment based on a 
synthesis of national-level future studies and providing an analysis of historical Special 
Forces missions that highlight a peer competitor focus, this study presents observations 
from a ready-to-use Table Top Exercise scoped toward Special Forces operating against a 
peer competitor in armed conflict. The study offers an analysis of the TTX observations 
by presenting a DOTmLPF and War Fighting Functions crosswalk meant to highlight 
potential capability gaps within U.S. Army Special Forces. It then concludes by 
presenting recommendations centered on transforming leadership and education practices 
as well as exploring new concepts and doctrine within U.S. Army Special Forces to better 
prepare the regiment for war against a peer. 
v 
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This study explores the role of U.S. Army Special Forces in a future peer-level war 
and is intended for leaders who recruit, train, sustain, retain, force-provide and command 
Special Forces soldiers. It is meant to inspire those same leaders to reflect, consider and 
prepare for such an eventuality and accomplishes this by exposing potential capability 
gaps, highlighting critical implications and presenting recommendations to better prepare 
the force for such a war. 
 
Key Elements  
• A synthesis of national-level future studies 2030–2050  
• Observations from a ready-to-use Table Top Exercise for staffs or 
detachment-level training  
• Capability gap analysis by DOTmLPF-P and Warfighting Function 
Crosswalk  
B. BACKGROUND 
U.S. Army Special Forces are adept at accomplishing their core tasks, often within 
the cooperation and competition realms of the conflict continuum, and against less-than-
peer adversaries. Methods, skills and capabilities needed to complete the same tasks against 
a peer competitor during armed conflict have likely waned, some tasks may need to be 
accomplished differently, and new ones may need to be developed. As the Department of 
Defense re-directs its focus on great power competition in the midst of an increasingly 
complex operating environment, this study aims to fill a gap in defense literature that 
explores and addresses how Special Forces will contribute to defeating a great power 




C. THE WAY AHEAD 
This study emphasizes a prudent approach to the study and preparation of future 
warfare and avoids an alarmist tone while encouraging similar efforts take place. It does 
not advocate sweeping changes or re-directions for the Special Forces Regiment based on 
the possibility of a great power war. Contrarily, it focuses on the least likely but most 
dangerous eventuality. In this case, the research highlighted that the skills and capabilities 
that U.S. Army Special Forces provide will still be valuable in a large-scale war, but the 
way they provide them may change. Studies like this one may encourage innovation, 
initiate challenging conversations and spark professional debate to identify those changes 
while illuminating problems before they are encountered on the battlefield. Doing so may 
avoid unnecessary losses while increasing the possibility of victory in a war the United 
States must win. 
 
D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Observations from a Table Top Exercise written and facilitated by the authors, and 
which places Special Forces teams in a denied area against Russia, were categorically 
binned using the Warfighting Functions.1 Each observation was then applied across the 
elements of the DOTmLPF-P framework, creating a crosswalk meant to identify 
implications for U.S. Army Special Forces and highlight potential capability gaps. Two 
consistent and thematic trends appeared throughout the study and directly inspired the 
authors’ recommendations, which aim to prepare U.S. Army Special Forces for war against 
a great power adversary. (See Table, next page.)  
 
                                                 
1 The Table Top Exercise was completed as part of a Naval Postgraduate School Wargame 
Applications course and was determined by the NPS Institutional Review Board to not constitute Human 
Subjects Research as found by HSR Determination dated 28 February 2017.  No Personally Identifiable 
Information was obtained by the players for the exercise. 
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 1. Findings in the study suggest a 
greater emphasis within concepts, 
doctrine and training should be 
placed on the conduct of 
Unconventional Warfare in dense 
urban areas. 
 
Urbanization and increasingly capable 
sensors, precise and lethal weapons 
force elements to hide in the complex 
terrain of cities. The same 
advancements make traditional SF rural 
safe-havens untenable and directly 
affect how SF will survive and achieve 
UW tasks (recruit, train, organize, 
employ) with partners 
2. Distinct attention to concepts, 
doctrine and training is needed, 
which emphasize the creation and 
mending of networks during 
conflict and after they are disrupted 
or destroyed. 
 
In a peer-level fight, SF should expect 
portions of the human infrastructure 
established prior to conflict to be 
disrupted or destroyed by capable 
adversaries before arriving on the 
battlefield. Networks and relationships 
with partners created in phase zero will 
likely remain critical to most SF 
missions and will need to be mended 
























1. More senior leaders should 
expect decisions typically made at 
higher levels to be made at lower 
ones while re-calibrating their own 
metrics for risk perception and 
degrees of delegating authority. 
Every effort should be made to 
develop and prepare more junior 
leaders to assume greater 
responsibility while improving 
decision-making acumen and 
judgment at levels commensurate 
with battalion commanders and 
above. 
An increasingly complex battlefield will 
make human decisions surrounding 
lethal fires, risk perception and 
managing strategic relationships more 
difficult. The speed, depth, lethality and 
disaggregated nature of the future 
battlefield will demand leaders who can 
make better decisions faster than what is 
required today. 
1. Deliberately explore future war. 
Training and professional 
development exercises (like the 
TTX and similar efforts) that 
challenge traditional approaches 
and missions frequently conducted 
since 9/11, and include complex 
problems against forces with 
capabilities equal to our exceeding 
those of the U.S. should be common 
place within Special Forces Groups 
and other similar units.  
Staffs and detachments conducting 
scenario-based training offers a cost-
effective means to train for unlikely but 
dangerous scenarios and can identify 
problems that may elude leaders who 
are already busy with day-to-day 
requirements. Exploring plausible future 
scenarios cultivates an inquisitive 
mentality that defies the mantra that 
tomorrow will look like today and may 
help identify leaders who excel in 
complex environments while mitigating 
those who do not. 
xvii 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. BACKGROUND TO THE PROBLEM 
United States Army Special Forces are adept at accomplishing their principal tasks 
(Figure 1), often within the cooperation and competition realms of the conflict continuum 
(Figure 2), and against less-than-peer adversaries. 
 
 U.S. Army Special Forces Principal Tasks. Source: 
Field Manual 3–18 Special Forces Operations (2014).2 
                                                 




 Conflict Continuum. Source: Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations (2017).3 
The skills and capabilities needed to complete the same tasks against a great power 
adversary have not been similarly tested by U.S. Army Special Forces. Some tasks may 
need to be accomplished differently and new ones may need to be developed. With a re-
invigorated focus on great power competition with Russia and China and a future 
environment that will likely see long-range precision strike weapons, advanced sensors, 
cyber, electronic, and space-based capabilities, it is prudent for U.S. Army Special Forces 
to analyze their role in Large-Scale Combat Operations with a great power adversary in the 
near future. 
Appropriately scoping this study necessitates describing two fundamental 
variables, Large-Scale Combat Operations and great powers. Joint Publication 3–0, Joint 
Operations describes Large-Scale Combat Operations as consisting of combat typically 
carried out within the framework of campaigns and operations to “achieve national 
strategic objectives or protect national interests.”4 The focus of this study is squarely on 
                                                 
3 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3–0 Joint Operations (Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 
2017), http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf. 
4 JCS, Joint Operations. 
3 
the clash of armed forces on the right side of the conflict continuum outlined above and 
describes war in which combatants employ an array of methods and all elements of national 
power. Adopted from a 2018 Center for Strategic and International Studies report, 
“Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts,” this study will use the term 
great power adversary. Cancian defines a great power adversary as a country that “can 
compete with the United States in multiple warfighting domains…, endanger fundamental 
U.S. national security goals, and threaten devastation to the U.S. homeland and way of 
life.”5 
1. Great Power Wars  
The National Intelligence Council’s report, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress, 
posits that the period of U.S. dominance that followed the end of the Cold War is fading.6 
So too are the circumstances that, following World War II, mitigated the risk of another 
great power war among nation-states.7 Heightened degrees of geopolitical competition and 
disagreements on international norms and values have eroded an era of stability.8 For 
example, China’s economic growth and development coupled with its increasingly capable 
military, and Russia’s revisionist approach to its interests in Europe could plausibly create 
conditions “in which great power competition erupts into war.”9 Thus, as the U.S. military 
prepares for the future, it is prudent to contemplate Large-Scale Combat Operations against 
a great power adversary, even if that adversary may choose or prefer smaller-scale 
                                                 
5 Mark F. Cancian, “Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts” (CSIS, Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, February 2018), 13, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-
public/publication/180227_Cancian_CopingWithSurprise_wAppen_Web.pdf?0rD0fcMI7gGXNLM1AYJ
WoVsNT_xSxOiu.  
6 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington, D.C: National 
Intelligence Council, 2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/nic/GT-Full-Report.pdf, ix. 
7 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends. 
8 Frank Hoffman, “The Contemporary Spectrum of Conflict: What Is War?,” 2016 Index of U.S. 
Military Strength (blog), accessed July 17, 2018, 
https://index.heritage.org/military/2016/essays/contemporary-spectrum-of-conflict/. 
9 Frank Hoffman, “The Continuum of Contemporary Conflict” (Washington, D.C.: National Defense 
University, n.d.); Dean Cheng, “America Needs a Comprehensive Strategy for Countering China’s 




operations.10 This is true primarily for two reasons. First, on the far right of the conflict 
continuum (see Figure 2), war and Large-Scale Combat Operations pose the largest 
consequences.11 Though not inevitable, Large-Scale Combat Operations may nevertheless 
arise under conditions of an increasingly multipolar international power system, which best 
describes the environment the United States is now entering.12 Furthermore, as former 
presidential advisor and strategic studies scholar Colin Gray suggests, the reemergence or 
renewed awareness of non-traditional conflict that is increasingly prevalent today does not 
necessarily displace the danger of older modes of war.13  
2. The Future Operating Environment 
Between the years 2030 and 2050, long-range weapons, advanced sensors, space 
and cyber tools will likely alter the character of the battlefield. Lower-cost precision strike 
weapons will be increasingly lethal, with faster cycles of action and counteraction. 
Combined arms fighting will expand to include electronic, cyber, and other effects and 
alter the character of war, or the way wars are fought.14 The United States’ defense 
establishment is preparing for this new battlefield, acknowledging that its current priorities 
and doctrine require significant alterations to keep pace with countries like Russia and 
China.15 
The U.S. military’s admission that its priorities and doctrine need modification to 
address great power adversaries, combined with the increasing likelihood of a great power 
war as described above, exposes the need to explore possible futures and alternative 
concepts that allow the U.S. military to maintain advantage over its adversaries. 
                                                 
10 Cancian, “Avoiding Coping with Surprise in Great Power Conflicts.”  
11 Hoffman, “Continuum of Contemporary Conflict.” 
12 National Intelligence Council, Global Trends; Hoffman, “Continuum of Contemporary Conflict.” 
13 “Foresight into 21st Century Conflict: End of the Greatest Illusion?,” Foreign Policy Research 
Institute, accessed July 18, 2018, https://www.fpri.org/article/2016/09/foresight-21st-century-conflict-end-
greatest-illusion/; Colin S Gray, Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (London: Phoenix, 2006). 
14 Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group Cohort V, “Reconnaissance-Strike Battle: An 
Operational Concept for High-End War 2030–2050 (DRAFT),” June 16, 2017. 
15 Department of Defense, “2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.Pdf,” 2018, 
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
5 
Emphasizing this point, General Joseph Dunford, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
stated in 2016: “We’re already behind in adapting to the changed character of war today in 
so many ways.”16 Preparing for this adaptation of warfighting is difficult at best and could 
be dangerous at worst. In 2017, Professor Lawrence Freedman, a world-renowned military 
analyst, highlighted just how difficult predicting the future can be and notes how rarely the 
United States has accurately projected future war.17 Predicting the proverbial “black swan” 
is oxymoronic and by definition impossible.18 It is also not the intent of this study. Yet the 
U.S. military cannot afford to wait for events to unfold before considering and developing 
means to address them. As Dr. Andrew Krepinevich, a well-known defense analyst, 
explains, the DoD “must make decisions today on what military capabilities will equip 
America’s fighting forces decades from now.”19 To that end, analyzing U.S. Army Special 
Forces’ role in this future environment is a worthy effort and can help its leaders make 
better decisions in an uncertain world.20 
3. Acknowledging and Adapting 
The Joint Force, spurred by actions of revisionist states, has largely acknowledged 
the potential change in the character of war and that the current conflicts in which the 
United States finds itself today bear little resemblance to a great power war. The 2018 
National Defense Strategy outlines a complete paradigm shift in the Defense Department’s 
missions, regional priorities and the way it “does business.”21 Acknowledgment of this 
                                                 
16 “Gen. Dunford’s Remarks at the National Defense University Graduation,” Joint Chiefs of Staff, 
accessed July 18, 2018, http://www.jcs.mil/Media/Speeches/tabid/3890/Article/797847/gen-dunfords-
remarks-at-the-national-defense-university-graduation.aspx. 
17 Lawrence Freedman, The Future of War: A History, 2017, 
https://nls.ldls.org.uk/welcome.html?ark:/81055/vdc_100049066097.0x000001; Hoffman, “Continuum of 
Contemporary Conflict.” 
18 Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: The Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd ed., Random 
Trade (New York: Random House Trade Paperbacks, 2010). 
19 Andrew F. Krepinevich, 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the Twenty-First 
Century (New York: Bantam Books, 2009). 
20 Peter Schwartz, The Art of the Long View: Paths to Strategic Insight for Yourself and Your 
Company. (St Leonards, N.S.W.: Australian Business Network, 1996). 
21 Department of Defense, “2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.Pdf.” Herein, the U.S. 
Secretary of Defense acknowledges the U.S. military strategic advantages are eroding and directs a shift in 
defense priorities to “revisionist powers” and the way the defense department “does business.” 
6 
shift is also evident in current DoD and service-level efforts to create new operational and 
functional concepts that acknowledge tasks such as counterinsurgency as lesser-included 
to great power wars. Of critical importance to U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF), these 
concepts also call for SOF to operate within the enemy’s Deep Fires Areas, specifically 
relying on their ability to operate beyond the practical reach of conventional forces.22  
While similar efforts to address this potential future environment of great power 
competition exist within U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and Army 
Special Operations Forces (ARSOF), a closer look reveals gaps in research, concepts, and 
doctrine. Specifically, because ARSOF sees itself operating mainly within cooperation and 
competition on the conflict continuum (see Figure 2) and by optimizing itself for this 
approach, it largely overlooks Large-Scale Combat Operations against these same 
adversaries. Instead, the future the special operations community describes for itself is 
increasingly “gray” and current SOF literature advocates that its forces are the preeminent 
choice for this space.23 This study does not aim to disagree with this assessment, nor join 
in the debate of whether the “gray zone” is a new paradigm or, as pointed out by defense 
analyst John Arquilla, merely an unnecessary and flawed attempt at “a fresh definition for 
war in this era.”24 Instead, this study intends to highlight and explore the knowledge and 
capability gaps left exposed as ARSOF adopts this approach. As the several authors of 
“Seeing Gray in the Next World War” predict, “[w]hat is often overlooked in the 
                                                 
22 U.S. Army TRADOC, Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century (US 
Army TRADOC, October 2017), http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/Multi-Domain-Battle-
Evolution-of-Combined-Arms.pdf. 
23 Joseph Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” National Defense University 
Press, January 2016, http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Article/643108/unconventional-warfare-in-the-
gray-zone/; Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” Special Warfare 28, no. 4 (October 2015): 19–25. Authors 
of “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone” define the Gray Zone as a space in the peace-conflict 
continuum characterized by intense political, economic, informational and military competition more 
fervent in nature than normal steady-state diplomacy, yet short of conventional war. The authors suggest 
that SOF are the preeminent force in the Gray Zone, or the space between peace and war. Kapusta states 
“Traditional war might be the dominant paradigm of warfare, but gray zone challenges are the norm.” 
24 John Arquilla, “Perils of the Gray Zone: Paradigms Lost, Paradoxes Regained,” PRISM : A Journal 
of the Center for Complex Operations 7, no. 3 (May 2018): 118–28. 
7 
contemporary rush to highlight gray zones is that these intense competitions often lead to 
conventional war. There is an inherent escalation potential in gray zones.”25 
Toward that end, the SOF community’s emphasis on actions within gray zones that 
precede Large-Scale Combat Operations may lead to unintended consequences. For 
example, cognitive dissonances and organizational biases within the U.S. Army Special 
Forces community regarding operations in “cooperation” and “competition” against great 
power adversaries may leave gaps in operational concepts, doctrine and capabilities needed 
to conduct tasks within Large-Scale Combat Operations against those same foes.  
In total, the national defense documents and future defense studies referenced in 
this chapter and in Chapter II acknowledge a growing risk of war with a great power in a 
challenging future environment. Yet, current SOF documents fail to sufficiently address 
the role or implications for U.S. Army Special Forces during Large-Scale Combat 
Operations, instead focusing on indirect activities to prevent and deter an overt 
confrontation by describing actions taken before Large-Scale Combat Operations occur. 
Indeed, there is value in focusing on the latter; as strategist Colin Gray notes, the strategic 
utility of SOF today exists in its ability to achieve disproportionate effects relative to the 
size of the force, often in the space below the threshold of war.26 However, the same can 
be said for the former, as this utility can also be applied during war. Consequently, 
analyzing U.S. Army Special Forces’ role during Large-Scale Combat Operations warrants 
deeper exploration, as a tacit acknowledgment of its eventuality does little in the way of 
preparing for one.  
B. PURPOSE AND METHODOLOGY 
This study aims to provide insight on how U.S. Army Special Forces might 
contribute to defeating a great power adversary in Large-Scale Combat Operations in 
2030–2050. Specifically, it will explore how armed conflict with a great power in that 
future environment will shape U.S. Army Special Forces principal tasks. Examining this is 
                                                 
25 Neil Hollenbeck and Benjamin Jensen, “Seeing Gray in the Next World War,” War on the Rocks, 
February 21, 2017, https://warontherocks.com/2017/02/seeing-gray-in-the-next-world-war/. 
26 Colin S. Gray, Explorations in Strategy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998). 
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beneficial as the study may provide insight into: education for conventional and SOF 
commanders on possible characteristics of future conflicts, development of a U.S. Army 
Special Forces operating concept for Large-Scale Combat Operations, interoperability with 
conventional forces and their operating concepts and Doctrine, Organization, Training, 
materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policies (DOTmLPF-P) considerations for 
U.S. Army Special Forces.  
To analyze the role of U.S. Army Special Forces in a future great power war means 
delving into the unknown. Research and discussion of the future is inherently controversial, 
as the future is not fully knowable. Yet, it is also worth the risk of thoughtful, deliberate 
exploration as the benefits outweigh the costs. Deliberate, intentional thinking about the 
future and the U.S. military’s role within it is necessary if U.S. Army Special Forces and 
other units are to maintain and gain competitive advantages in an increasingly competitive 
world. To that end, the authors constructed and executed a seminar wargame, specifically 
a Table Top Exercise (TTX), with over thirty conventional and SOF players, using 
futuristic scenarios based on an analysis of future reports and global trends. The TTX was 
completed as part of a NPS Wargame Applications course and enabled the authors to 
explore and collect data regarding multiple U.S. Army Special Forces tasks, among 
different scenarios, all during Large-Scale Combat Operations with a great power 
adversary.27  
C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
To arrive at the final recommendations of this study, the players’ observations from 
the TTX were categorically binned utilizing the eight elements of combat power, 
commonly referred to as warfighting functions. Each observation was then applied across 
the elements of the DOTmLPF-P framework, essentially conducting a crosswalk meant to 
identify implications for U.S. Army Special Forces and highlight potential capability gaps 
(Table 1 in Chapter IV). While the crosswalk identified both narrow and broad 
                                                 
27 The Table Top Exercise was completed as part of a Naval Postgraduate Wargame Applications 
course and was determined by the NPS Institutional Review Board to not constitute Human Subjects 
Research as found by HSR Determination dated 28 February 2017. 
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implications, it also revealed two consistent and thematic trends that directly inspired the 
authors’ recommendations, which aim to prepare U.S. Army Special Forces for Large-
Scale Combat Operations against a great power adversary.  
The first trend highlights a need for further exploration of new U.S. Army Special 
Forces concepts and doctrine, which describe how units will fight in the future environment 
described throughout this study. Specifically, the study recommends further exploration 
into the conduct of Unconventional Warfare within a dense urban environment. 
Advancements in adversary sensing and fires capabilities compounded with complex urban 
terrain will likely directly affect the way U.S. Army Special Forces recruits, organizes and 
employs partner forces and make traditional rural safe havens untenable. Lastly, the study 
recommends an increased emphasis on creating and mending human infrastructure 
networks during war, as players in the TTX relied almost exclusively upon these networks 
to survive, sustain and maneuver. 
The second trend focuses clearly on implications that challenge traditional 
paradigms within the leadership and professional education realms within the U.S. Army 
Special Forces. The study recommends new approaches and offers several implications for 
how soldiers and leaders can prepare to cope with, and thrive in challenging environments 
that will likely yield limited communications, degraded situational awareness, and 
disaggregated maneuver elements at levels not seen today.  
Lastly, this study encourages leaders to prepare themselves and their units for war 
by challenging the traditional belief that tomorrow will look like today. To that end, this 
study challenges leaders to incorporate seminar wargames and tabletop exercises similar 
to the one used in this study to uncover more implications, highlight potential capability 
gaps and train subordinate leaders and staffs on methods and tools to address complex 
problems.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This study’s research may help to fill the knowledge and capability gaps identified 
above for several reasons. Primarily, despite the lower relative probability of Large-Scale 
Combat Operations occurring against a great power in the near future, the U.S. Army 
10 
Special Forces community should recognize that in the event it happens, they will not 
solely operate on the periphery in semi-permissive environments. Instead, as described in 
current U.S. Army operating concepts, U.S. Army Special Forces will likely be tasked to 
operate and survive in highly-contested areas against foes with capabilities equal to or 
exceeding those of the United States. The potential for U.S. Army Special Forces to be 
tasked with these, and other missions during Large-Scale Combat Operations should instill 
a strong desire to analyze and study how they would accomplish them without incurring 
unacceptable and avoidable losses.  
In this first chapter, the authors provided background information to the problem 
and identified key knowledge gaps this study aims to fill. In Chapter II, the authors provide 
a literature review that analyzes the Future Operating Environment and explores the 
historical roles of U.S. Army Special Forces upon its inception. Chapter III includes a 
description of the research methodology centered on the future-based TTX and presents 
key findings and observations (Appendix U.S. Army Special Forces 2035 Table Top 
Exercise). In Chapter IV, the authors provide recommendations to the U.S. Army Special 




II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. PURPOSE 
This chapter provides context regarding the knowledge and capability gaps 
discussed in Chapter One, specifically the lack of emphasis currently placed on U.S. Army 
Special Forces’ role in conducting Large-Scale Combat Operations against great power 
adversaries. The authors first explore U.S. Army Special Forces’ initial purpose and early 
operations, then merge several notable future studies to provide a consumable forecast, and 
finally, examine the various stakeholders’ approaches to addressing these future forecasts. 
Analyzing U.S. Army Special Forces’ early operations exposes the unit’s true design, 
which ultimately was to provide unique capabilities for use against a great power adversary 
during Large-Scale Combat Operations. Having highlighted the historical role of U.S. 
Army Special Forces in this context, a synthesis of prominent future studies is offered that 
indicates a rise in great power competition and emphasis is placed upon potential military 
and battlefield implications. Lastly, the authors offer a critical analysis of the current 
future-based documents and operational concepts that further exposes the dearth of insight 
regarding U.S. Army Special Forces in Large-Scale Combat Operations against a great 
power. 
B. U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE  
1. Special Forces’ Original Purpose 
On  June 19, 1952, Colonel Aaron Bank, after years of lobbying alongside Brigadier 
General Robert McClure and Colonel Russell Volckmann for the creation of a special 
operations unit, activated and assumed command of 10th Special Forces Group 
(Airborne).28 Based on special operations conducted by the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS) in World War II, “the unit’s wartime mission was to develop, organize, train, equip, 
and direct anti-Soviet resistance forces in Eastern Europe in the event of war with the 
                                                 
28 Aaron Bank, From OSS to Green Berets: The Birth of Special Forces (New York: Pocket Books, 
1987), 187–88. 
12 
[Union of Soviet Socialist Republics].”29 Indeed, the focus on orchestrating resistance 
activity rings true throughout U.S. Army Special Forces’ history. Yet, another key part of 
the mission statement that seems to have faded from history, is the focus on the unit’s role 
during a major war with the Soviet Union. The ultimate purpose behind Colonel Bank’s 
new creation was to infiltrate into a denied area and operate against a great power adversary 
during Large-Scale Combat Operations.30 Certainly, the U.S. Army did not expect the unit 
to fight conventionally, as evident by the mission statement, but the demand for their niche 
capabilities in such a conflict was clear.  
Critical to the success of these early Special Forces pioneers was their clear 
articulation of Special Operations Forces’ unique capabilities. In particular, their ability to 
achieve significant impact at a strategic level with minimal resources during wartime.31 
While many World War II-era regular Army officers believed special operations was a 
sideshow, the facts gathered from OSS operations proved otherwise. They highlighted the 
ability of special operations to provide critical information, divert enemy forces, degrade 
enemy lines of communication, and attack the enemy’s morale.32 In the decades that 
followed its inception, Special Forces continued to grow and, while the mission set 
expanded to include tasks such as Counterinsurgency and Counter-terrorism, the emphasis 
on the unit’s role during a great power war never wavered, best evidenced by their early 
plans and operations.  
2. Early Special Forces’ Plans and Operations 
Examining U.S. Army Special Forces’ plans, training, and operations during the 
Cold War illustrate the importance the unit placed on maintaining its ability to operate 
against a great power adversary. Two notable examples are the development of the Green 
Light teams and the activities of Detachment-A (“Det-A”) in Berlin, Germany. Special 
                                                 
29 Thomas K. Adams, U.S. Special Operations Forces in Action: The Challenge of Unconventional 
Warfare (London: Frank Cass, 1998), 54. 
30 James Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the U.S. Army’s Elite, 
1956–1990 (Oxford: Casemate Publishers, 2017), 10. 
31 Bank, From OSS to Green Berets, 172–73. 
32 Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 4. 
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Forces maintained both missions throughout the Cold War, despite its high operational 
tempo, expansion of its principal tasks, and conflicts throughout Southeast Asia and 
Central and South America.  
a. PROJECT GREEN LIGHT 
During the 1950s, the U.S. military began experimenting with the notion of 
employing tactical nuclear weapons throughout its formations, which ultimately led to the 
development of one of U.S. Army Special Forces’ unique tasks: Project Green Light.33 
After testing nuclear artillery rounds, rockets, and even recoilless rifles, the U.S. Army 
eventually found advantages in utilizing the unique capabilities of U.S. Army Special 
Forces to deliver and employ the man-portable Atomic Demolition Munition (ADM), also 
known as the “backpack nuke.”34  
As the U.S. intelligence community identified potential targets for tactical nuclear 
strikes, it became clear that traditional means of delivery, such as aircraft or rockets, would 
not reliably neutralize many of the selected targets.35 However, U.S. Army Special Forces 
retained the ability to infiltrate into these denied environments and reliably employ the 
weapon system on the right target at the right time. Not every Group received this tasking, 
those who were, assigned one detachment per company to the mission. The training and 
certification process was strenuous with no tolerance for error.36 The “Green Light teams” 
developed procedures to deliver the ADMs via land, air, and sea using “ratline,” free fall, 
and underwater methods.37 The teams also went to great lengths to test their 
communication equipment’s capabilities and survivability under the arduous conditions 
caused by the proximity of a nuclear detonation. Lastly, the Green Light teams emphasized 
training on surviving and operating within a denied environment with little support, as each 
                                                 
33 Alex Wojcicki, “Green Light: The Weapon We Never Used,” in Special Forces, the First Fifty 
Years : The United States Army Special Forces 1952–2002, United States Army Special Forces 1952–2002 
(Tampa, FL: Faircount LLC, 2002), 320–21. 
34 Wojcicki, 321. 
35 Wojcicki, 321. 
36 Wojcicki, 321. 
37 Wojcicki, 323. 
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detachment expected to be behind enemy lines for an unknown period following their 
ADM employment. Despite these challenges, U.S. Army Special Forces excelled during 
the annual exercises and inspections, thus maintaining the mission set for almost thirty 
years.38 Some contribute the very survival of U.S. Army Special Forces to the ADM 
mission. The project’s relevancy in potentially crippling the Soviets in the initial stages of 
war ultimately outweighed the Army’s attempts to eliminate Special Forces during the 
downsizing that followed the Vietnam War.39  
Mention of Project Green Light may conjure imaginings of kamikaze-style suicide 
missions or perhaps even disbelief that the U.S. government ever contemplated such a high-
risk operation. Yet, the mission was real and remained a vital part of U.S. Army Special 
Forces for almost three decades. This cognitive gap that exists between contemporary and 
Project Green Light-era U.S. Army Special Forces members highlights the deliberate 
approach required to prepare for Large-Scale Combat Operations against a great power 
adversary. It can also help expose U.S. Army Special Forces’ potential capability gaps for 
such a task and should move the community to prepare for operating in this type of war. 
b. DETACHMENT-A 
On June 17, 1953, anti-Communist-government protests erupted across Soviet-
controlled East Germany, particularly in East Berlin, surprising both the United States and 
Soviet governments.40 The Soviets reacted swiftly with military action to quell the uprising 
against the German Democratic Republic government. The United States government, 
despite broadcasting propaganda implying otherwise, failed to assist the protestors in their 
rebellion against communism. Tensions rose as the likelihood of war increased. The U.S. 
military emphasized the importance in delaying the Soviet advance in Europe in the early 
stages of a war, as this facilitated the transportation of U.S. reinforcements to the European 
continent.41 To assist in this delaying action, in November of 1955, six U.S. Army Special 
                                                 
38 Wojcicki, 322–23. 
39 Wojcicki, 322. 
40 Stejskal, Special Forces Berlin, 1–2. 
41 Stejskal, 15. 
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Forces teams formed Detachment-A and deployed to Berlin, to operate under the U.S. 
Commander of Berlin.  
Detachment-A’s mission upon the outbreak of war was to sabotage vital targets 
within East Berlin and then transition to Unconventional Warfare operations with local 
guerrillas in East Germany in order to delay the movements of Warsaw Pact forces.42 Two 
of the six teams planned to operate inside the Berlin Wall area, while the remaining four 
teams planned to operate outside of the city, with each one assigned specific boundaries.43 
The composition of these teams required considerable thought, as Det-A would operate 
clandestinely among the local population. At the time, this task was not as insurmountable 
as it might seem today. The U.S. Army Special Forces was formed for this exact mission. 
As a result of the Lodge Act, which enabled recruitment of foreign nationals to enlist in 
the U.S. Army to receive U.S. citizenship in return, the 10th Special Forces Group retained 
several soldiers of Eastern European and German descent who joined Detachment-A.44  
During its 35-year existence, “Det-A” developed detailed target folders, conducted 
reconnaissance in East Berlin and East Germany, prepared to arm and organize resistance 
forces, emplaced weapons and equipment caches, and even participated in the ADM 
mission set.45 While the focus was always on Unconventional Warfare in a general sense, 
in 1981, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, General Bernard Rogers, made 
Strategic Intelligence Collection and Target Acquisition the unit’s top priority.46 General 
Rogers made it clear that Det-A was in a unique location and possessed special capabilities 
that would enable them to provide near real-time information about Warsaw Pact forces’ 
movements and intentions, while still maintaining Unconventional Warfare as a follow-on 
task.47  
                                                 
42 Stejskal, 26–27. 
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44 Stejskal, 19. 
45 Stejskal, 27, 35, 55–59. 
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Project Green Light and Detachment-A were challenging mission sets aimed at 
achieving strategic objectives. The idea of operating behind the Iron Curtain against the 
Soviet Union was a daunting one, yet U.S. Army Special Forces was ready to execute both 
missions for over three decades. Similar to U.S. Army Special Forces teams tasked with 
the ADM mission, “Det-A” was also tasked to conduct a myriad of secondary 
requirements, including but not limited to counter-terrorism (which included assistance to 
Operation EAGLE CLAW, the attempted rescue of hostages in Iran), Foreign Internal 
Defense, vulnerability assessments, and even Vietnam rotations.48 These additional, short-
notice tasks demanded attention, yet U.S. Army Special Forces always balanced them with 
their primary requirement of standing ready to operate against the Soviet Union during 
Large-Scale Combat Operations. It was evident that while they understood that it was more 
likely they would be called to conduct a counter-terrorism mission than fight World War 
III, the relative consequences of not being prepared for the latter were more severe. 
C. ENVISIONING THE FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT  
The risk of conflict, including interstate conflict, will increase during the 
next two decades [2017-2037] due to evolving interest among major 
powers, ongoing terrorist threats, continued instability in weak states, and 
the spread of lethal and disruptive technologies.  
—National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends, 2017 
1. Purpose 
This section describes a possible future operating environment between 2030–2050 
by exploring four separate categories: technology, international relations, state governance, 
and military implications. Through the compilation of several prominent futures studies, 
this literature review presents a different reality from what the U.S. military has become 
accustomed to since the end of the Cold War. Analyzing alternative futures enables the 
U.S. military to take measures to address potential capability gaps in its forces, equipment, 
operating concepts, and doctrine.  
                                                 
48 Stejskal, 271–72. 
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2. Summary  
The rate of technology invention, the degree to which the international system 
becomes more multipolar, and the ability of states to manage increasingly complex 
governing challenges will determine the Future Operating Environment between 2030–
2050.49 The speed and degree of convergence of these three trends will determine when, 
where, why and how great powers use force.50 Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), autonomous systems, and increasingly lethal weapons with extended ranges will 
make surviving and operating in this sensor-rich future environment difficult. Cyber, space 
and long-range fires capabilities will expand the battlefield.51 Russia and China, with 
access to these technologies, will likely challenge U.S. interests globally as absolute power 
diffuses and regional conflict becomes more abundant. Governments, already burdened by 
climate change, resource competition, migration and demographic trends will struggle for 
legitimacy and security. This increase in government instability is more likely to stress the 
international system, creating higher demands for stability and security operations.52 
Moves from great revisionist powers, similar to recent efforts by Russia in Ukraine and 
China in the South China Sea, will likely strain the U.S. military as each move may demand 
the U.S. government’s attention and require counter-moves. In total, conflict in and among 
states is more likely.  
3. Technology  
The rapid development of new technologies such as advanced computing, Artificial 
Intelligence, autonomous systems, additive manufacturing, and alternative energies, 
coupled with the proliferation of low-cost interconnected current technologies, may 
fundamentally disrupt the entire U.S. military organization. Though the rate of invention 
                                                 
49 Joint Force Development, “Joint Operating Environment 2035 The Joint Force in a Contested and 
Disordered World,” July 14, 2016, http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Concepts/JOE/; Chief of Staff of the 
Army’s Strategic Studies Group, “The Character of Warfare 2030-2050: Technological Change, the 
International System, and the State,” July 12, 2016. Though many factors contribute to the future operating 
environment between 2030–2050, they can be appropriately binned into these three categories. 
50 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
51 CSA Strategic Studies Group Cohort V, “Reconnaissance-Strike Battle” 
52 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
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of new technologies is disputed, the unequal distribution of these technologies is likely to 
cause conflict as governments develop new ways to incorporate them into forms of fighting 
(i.e., innovation).53 Many sources note the development of AI may be the single most 
disruptive technology between 2030–2050 to the extent that it has implications in so many 
other areas.54 A 2013 report from McKinsey and Company, a global management and 
consulting firm, identified the most likely disruptive technologies as: 
• Mobile Internet Increasingly inexpensive and capable mobile computing 
devices and Internet connectivity; 
• The Internet of Things Networks of low-cost sensors and actuators for 
data collection, monitoring, decision making, and process optimization;  
• Advanced robotics Increasingly capable robots with enhanced senses, 
dexterity, and intelligence used to automate tasks or augment humans;  
• Autonomous and near-autonomous vehicles Vehicles that can navigate 
and operate with reduced or no human intervention;  
• Next-generation genomics Fast, low-cost gene sequencing, advanced big 
data analytics, and synthetic biology (“writing” DNA);  
• Energy storage Devices or systems that store energy for later use, 
including batteries;  
• 3D printing Additive manufacturing techniques to create objects by 
printing layers of material based on digital models;  
• Advanced materials Materials designed to have superior characteristics 
(e.g., strength, weight, conductivity) or functionality;  
• Renewable energy Generation of electricity from renewable sources with 
reduced harmful climate impact.55 
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4. International System  
Prominent futures studies view the international system--defined as a system 
composed of states that shapes how, when, where, and why armed conflict occurs--on a 
spectrum with optimistic and pessimistic poles.56 As captured in the Chief of Staff of the 
Army’s Strategic Studies Group’s research on the character of warfare in 2030–2050, 
integrated and cooperative relations represent more optimistic views while fragmented and 
competitive ones lie on the other end of the scale.57 The Atlantic Council’s forecast, 
“Envisioning 2030: U.S. Strategy for the Coming Technology Revolution,” claims the 
United States is likely to be in a privileged position and maintain significant global 
influence relative to other great powers, yet will no longer be hegemonic due to the rise of 
regional competitors.58 The study goes on to say rising regional hegemons will use their 
growing influence to shape their respective regions while protecting them from outsiders, 
escalating risk of conflict. While reports claim that India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, South 
Africa, and Brazil have potential to become poles in the future system, the “4+1” threat is 
the most prevalent throughout the reports (Figure 3). 
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 The “4 + 1” Threat59 
5. State Governance  
The nation-state in the world of 2030–2050 will likely remain the power broker and 
primary actor in the international system, but any given country may be weaker 
domestically and globally than it is today.60 Power is diffusing from the state as immense 
challenges of aging societies, urbanization, resource inequality, climate change, religious 
and ethnic tensions compete for finite resources and attention (Figure 4). Meanwhile, 
governments will compete for power with super-empowered individuals, mega-
corporations, and transnational criminal organizations who use violent and non-violent 
means to achieve their ends and who are further enabled by technology to organize quickly 
and cheaply. Strained state systems and security apparatuses will struggle to govern as 
                                                 
59 U.S. Army TRADOC G2, “The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future 
Warfare,” accessed January 30, 2018, http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/The-Operational-
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The “4+1” Threat 
• Russia can be considered our “pacing threat,” and will be our most capable potential foe until 
the 2035 timeframe. It will remain a key adversary through 2050.  
• China is rapidly modernizing its armed forces and investing heavily in readiness and 
technological research. Its rapid development means that it likely will surpass Russia as our 
pacing threat sometime prior to 2035.  
• North Korea lacks the capabilities of Russia or China, but its large but outdated military, its 
credible ballistic missile force, expanding cyber capabilities, and nuclear capabilities make it a 
significant regional threat through 2025-2030. 
• Iran through 2025-2030 represents a non-nuclear regional hegemon, but is likely to develop 
nuclear weapons sometime prior to 2035. Its geography and mastery of hybrid conflict 
involving proxies, coupled with ambitious military reforms means it is likely that Iran remains 
a key concern to 2035.  
• Radical Ideologues and Transnational Criminal Organizations like ISIS, al-Qa’ida, 
Lebanese Hizballah, or Latin American drug cartels and other groups which will sprout up in 
reaction to the unfolding OE will remain difficult and capable threats through 2035, and 
probably beyond. Although individual groups will rise and fall, radical ideologues and 
transnational criminal organizations will be able to match terrorism and insurgency with 
increasing access to commercially available technologies and connections to nation states and 
criminal elements to remain viable.  
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demographic trends in more wealthy nations lead to an increasingly graying population 
stressing national budgets while less wealthy states become increasingly young, urban and 
angry.61 These ingredients will likely increase intrastate conflict and increase the number 
of failed or weakened states placing an increased demand for those who can export support 
and security. 
Megacities 
The number of cities with a population in excess of 10 million: 
• 1950: 2 megacities 
• 1990: World is 43% urbanized 
• 2005: 20 megacities 
• 2015: World is 54% urbanized 
• 2030: 41 megacities 
• 2050: World is 66% urbanized 
*Table from CSA SSG Report: Data from UN, World 
Urbanization Report (2014) 
 U.N. World Urbanization Report62 
6. Military Implications  
There is a growing consensus among prominent futures studies that significant 
discontinuities in the character of warfare are approaching rapidly.63 Certain military 
implications of these trends is aptly captured in the excerpt below from the Army’s 
preeminent futures wargame Unified Quest in 2016. 
Sensors are ubiquitous, multi-domain and capable of discreetly and 
accurately locating and targeting any and everything moving in the 
battlespace. Similarly, advances in lethal, smart weapons systems, mostly 
autonomous, and munitions enable precision, real-time, effective attack and 
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destruction of discrete targets in all domains throughout the battlespace. 
Integrating these sensor / shooter combinations will be holistic, integrated 
mission command systems that ensure real-time situational understanding, 
decision making and execution, much of which will be autonomous.  
—Jim Greer64 
Put simply, advanced military capabilities will likely shape the battlefields of 2030–
2050. Military power and shaping will likely rest on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
ballistic missiles, and precision-strike technologies, all enhanced by cyber capabilities.65 
Increasingly, combined arms fighting will expand to include electronic, cyber and other 
effects.66 Due to increased connectivity, battlefield events will affect the global information 
environment even faster than they do today. A premium will be placed on the fight for 
information while survival and victory will go to those who understand and act faster.67 
Some have labeled events on this future battlefield as “Advanced Engagements,” which 
can be described as: 
• “… compressed in time, as the speed of weapon delivery and their 
associated effects accelerate enormously;  
• … extended in space, in many cases to a global extent, via precision long-
range strike and interconnectedness, particularly in the information 
environment;  
• … far more lethal, by virtue of ubiquitous sensors, proliferated precision, 
high kinetic energy weapons and advanced area munitions;  
• … routinely interconnected – and contested -- across the multiple 
domains of air, land, sea, space and cyber;  
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• … interactive across the multiple dimensions of conflict, not only 
across every domain in the physical dimension, but also the cognitive 
dimension of information operations, and even the moral dimension of 
belief and values.”68 
Innovation--the addition of new technologies into ways of fighting--will be 
paramount as adversary capabilities will pose significant challenges to U.S. efforts as 
dominance in any domain may no longer be feasible. Disruptive technologies, or 
technologies so advanced that U.S. doctrine is re-shaped to take full advantage, will arrive 
at varying speeds and densities (Figures 5 and 6).69  
 U.S. Army Projections of “Game Changers” through 203570 
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Potential Game Changers through 2035 
Evolutionary technologies that, if matured and fielded, can provide a decisive edge over an adversary 
unable to match the capability or equal the capacity. 
• Advanced ATGM & MANPADS - Proliferate more rapidly than Active Protection systems 
develop, putting armored vehicles and helicopters at risk 
• Robotics – 40+ countries develop military robotics with some level of autonomy 
• Space – 50+ nations operating in space. Increasingly, congested and difficult to monitor. PNT 
at risk  
• Chemical Weapons – Nontraditional agents developed to defeat detection and protection 
capabilities 
• Camouflage, Cover, concealment, Denial & Deception (C3D2) – Creates uncertainly and 
challenges multi-discipline intelligence 
• Cannon/Rocket Artillery – Long-range artillery, hardened GPS munitions defeat jamming. 
Point air defense defend against PGM 
• Missiles – Developed for greater range and improved accuracy using inertial guidance 
• Computing/Cyber – Human-Computer interaction is transformed. Processing power increases 
exponentially. Big Data and Quantum Computing 
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 U.S. Army Projections of “Game Changers” through 205071 
D. ADDRESSING THE FUTURE 
Acknowledging this future operating environment and the potential implications 
for U.S. national security, President Donald J. Trump released the 2017 National Security 
Strategy (NSS), with a focus on renewing the military’s competitive advantages, promoting 
innovation, and revitalizing the defense industrial base.72 The document boldly names the 
“revisionist powers of China and Russia,” describing them as challengers in multiple 
domains attempting to undermine the United States, its allies, and its values.73 The NSS 
calls for the Department of Defense to “develop new operational concepts and capabilities 
to win without assured dominance in air, maritime, land, space, and cyberspace 
domains.”74 The 2018 National Defense Strategy follows a similar theme, stating boldly 
that the DoD is “emerging from a period of strategic atrophy” and stepping into a world 
where “[i]nter-state strategic competition…is now the primary concern in U.S. national 
                                                 
71 U.S. Army TRADOC G2, “The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future 
Warfare.” 
72 Donald Trump, National Security Strategy (Washington, DC: White House, 2017), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf. 
73 Trump, NSS. 
74 Trump, NSS. 
Potential Game Changers through 2050 
• Laser and Radio Frequency Weapons – Scalable lethal directed energy which can counter aircraft, 
UAS, Missiles, Projectiles, Sensors and Swarms 
• Swarms – Leverage autonomy, robotics, and artificial intelligence to generate “global behavior with 
local rules” for multiple entities – either homogeneous or heterogeneous teams.  
• Rail Guns and Enhanced Directed Kinetic Energy Weapons (EDKEW) – Non-explosive 
electromagnetic projectile launchers provide high velocity/high energy weapons.  
• Energetics – Provides increased accuracy and muzzle energy.  
• Synthetic Biology – Engineering and modification of biological entities has potential weaponization.  
• Internet of Things – Linked internet “things” create opportunity and vulnerability. Great potential 
benefits already found in developing U.S. systems also create a vulnerability.  
• Power – Future effectiveness depends on renewable sources and reduced consumption.  
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security.”75 The document goes onto to call the Joint Force to match the new reality of 
“strategic competition, rapid dispersion of technologies, and new concepts of warfare.”76  
Thus, in efforts reminiscent of past doctrinal adaptations such as AirLand Battle, 
Army After Next and Force XXI, senior U.S. Defense officials, including the Chief of Staff 
of the Army, have directed internal assessments to address the U.S. military’s viability in 
a future conflict.77 These directed initiatives include the development of new operational 
concepts, doctrine, future studies, an invigorated research and development community 
and a new U.S. Army Futures Command that will oversee U.S. Army modernization 
efforts.78  
To keep pace with the changing character of war and address new challenges, the 
U.S. Army develops new concepts that are meant to drive change across large organizations 
and within complex bureaucracies. Conceptual change in the way the U.S. military fights 
wars precedes doctrinal development, a requirement to formally address new military 
problems stemming from evolving adversary capabilities and complexities associated with 
the future operating environment and a morphing geopolitical landscape. The precedent of 
U.S. Army doctrinal change to address new environments and challenges is evidenced in 
recent history by the evolution of its flagship manual Operations, which has been re-written 
nine times since 1975.79 Today, the United States again finds itself on the cusp of complex 
                                                 
75 Department of Defense, National Defense Strategy (Washington, DC, 2018), 
https://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. 
76 Department of Defense, NDS. 
77 Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, “The Army After Next,” October 1996, 
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/csi/docs/Gorman/06_Retired/02_Retired_1991_99/17_97_DARPA_ForAAN_
1May.pdf; “Force XXI OPERATIONS TRADOC Pamphlet 525-5” (US Army TRADOC, August 1, 1994), 
http://webapp1.dlib.indiana.edu/virtual_disk_library/index.cgi/4240529/FID3171/ACDOCS/PAPERS/B00
4.PDF; “FM 100-5: Operations, 1982. :: Obsolete Military Manuals,” accessed February 7, 2018, 
http://cgsc.cdmhost.com/cdm/ref/collection/p4013coll9/id/48. 
78 “Statement by LTG Murray, LTG Anderson, LTG Ostrowski and MG Dyess Before the 
Subcommittee on Airland Committee on Armed Services United States Senate on Army Modernization,” 
February 7, 2018, https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Murray-Anderson-Ostrowski-
Dyess_02-07-18.pdf. 
79 Benjamin Jensen, Forging the Sword: Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army (Stanford, California: 
Stanford Security Studies, an imprint of Stanford University Press, 2016). Re-written twice since the 
publication of Jensen’s book. 
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changes within the future operating environment that will affect the way it deters potential 
adversaries, and ultimately fight wars. 
The 2018 Army Operating Concept and attendant 2017 Multi-Domain Battle 
concepts address the future operating environment directly by providing a robust 
intellectual foundation and operational framework to guide and drive future force design 
and development.80 More importantly, they both acknowledge an elevated risk of war with 
a great power and describe how the Army, as part of the Joint Force will operate against 
great power adversaries in war between 2020–2040. Necessarily, these concepts describe 
how Army forces operate across the full Range of Military Operations (ROMO), and 
thoughtfully describe how U.S. forces will operate on a complex battlefield against an 
adversary with capabilities equal to, or exceeding those of the United States. The Army 
Operating Concept also adds special operations to its core competencies, which previously 
listed only wide area security and combined arms maneuver. That special operations was 
added as a core competency is indicative of the dynamic and unique contributions they can 
provide the Joint Force throughout the ROMO and should move the special operations 
community to study their potential roles in future conflicts more closely. In fact, both 
documents highlight certain roles where special operations’ capabilities would be 
especially effective against great power adversaries in the future, and within the new 
operational framework the concepts convey.81 
To contribute to the Army Operating Concept, U.S. Army Special Operations 
Command (USASOC) issued its operating concept in the same year (2014) that provided 
the conceptual foundation for special operations as a U.S. Army core competency by 
emphasizing its two pillars: special warfare and surgical strike.82 The newer USASOC 
                                                 
80 U.S. Army TRADOC, Multi-Domain Battle: Evolution of Combined Arms for the 21st Century; 
U.S. Army TRADOC, TRADOC Pamphlet 525–3-1 The U.S. Army Operating Concept Win in A Complex 
World, accessed January 26, 2018, http://www.tradoc.army.mil/tpubs/pams/tp525-3-1.pdf. 
81 Multi-Domain Battle highlights SOF for use in the enemy’s deep fire area and especially in a 
counter-Unconventional Warfare role against enemy proxies, insurgents and stay-behind forces. Though 
Multi-Domain Battle does not state Counter-Unconventional Warfare, it is implied. It also calls for 
increased collaboration and interdependence with conventional forces to achieve cross-domain affects in a 
sensor-rich precision strike, lethal environment. 
82 US Army Special Operations Command, ARSOF Operating Concept 2022, September 26, 2014, 
http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/ARSOF%20Operating%20Concept%202014.pdf. 
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2035 and USSOCOM operating concepts highlight SOF’s unique capabilities and 
contributions to the Joint Force with its primary focus on indigenous approaches, precision 
targeting, influence and crisis response operations.83 Similar to the Army Operating 
Concept and Multi-Domain Battle, the special operations documents also acknowledge a 
complex future operating environment and the growing possibility of overt confrontation 
with a great power. However, they focus more closely on actions and activities to prevent 
and deter hybrid conflicts short of all-out war, as opposed to explaining their role within 
one. This is true for two primary reasons. One, SOF’s structure, core activities, and 
traditional roles are optimized for, and often achieved through, indirect methods using 
niche capabilities, as opposed to the decisive action akin to conventional forces. Two, 
though the possibility of a direct clash or Large-Scale Combat Operations with a great 
power in the future exists, and perhaps is escalating, it is not acknowledged as the most 
likely scenario. To that end, SOF must prepare for missions they are likely going to be 
asked to do. By nature, though, emphasis in one direction assumes risks and vulnerabilities 
in the other, even if the relative odds of occurrence are assessed to be low. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The fusion of the futures studies presented above suggests there may likely be a 
significant shift away from today’s character of war. Instead, the studies project a world in 
which great power competition and the probability of Large-Scale Combat Operations 
between great powers is elevated. Granted, while the likelihood of great power war is 
forecast to increase, it does not stand as the most likely reality; yet, it remains the most 
dangerous. Thus, key national-level documents are providing new guidance and the Joint 
Force is experimenting with new concepts. The U.S. Army Special Forces can do the same. 
Studying Cold War-era U.S. Army Special Forces operations certainly helps one 
understand the historical roles that Special Forces used to fill in the event of Large-Scale 
Combat Operations against a great power; however, further efforts are required. When 
                                                 
83 US Army Special Operations Command, United States Army Special Operations Command 
Campaign Plan 2035, May 4, 2017, 
http://www.soc.mil/Assorted%20Pages/USASOC%20CAMPLAN2035%20Final.pdf; USSOCOM, 
SOCOM 2035 Commander’s Strategic Guidance (USSOCOM, March 7, 2016); Director, FMD SOCOM, 
Special Operations Forces Operating Concept, February 1, 2016. 
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faced with complex problems in a changing future environment, such as the one presented 
in this study, few approaches generate innovative concepts and new ideas better than the 
proven method of the wargame.  
29 
III. METHODOLOGY 
It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future. 
—Yogi Berra, 1972 Baseball Hall of Famer 
A. PURPOSE  
In this chapter, the authors outline the research methodology, describe the 
development and execution of the U.S. Army Special Forces 2035 Table Top Exercise, and 
present the observations derived from the TTX (see Appendix U.S. Army Special Forces 
2035 Table Top Exercise). Key components of the methodology discussed in this chapter 
include a brief history on wargaming and its benefits, to include advantages gained by 
utilizing innovative scenarios, as well as the development process for synthesizing future 
reports and employing a facilitated TTX. Through the design, development, and execution 
of a TTX, this research aims to provide insight into how U.S. Army Special Forces will 
contribute to defeating a great power adversary in Large-Scale Combat Operations in 2035. 
Specifically, how will conflict with a great power in this described future environment 
shape U.S. Army Special Forces’ principal tasks in the future?  
B. WARGAMING AND SCENARIOS 
Looking into this future is challenging. However, the difficulty in looking 
ahead does not excuse the military professional from considering the 
demands of future war. As the ultimate guarantor of the safety and security 
of the United States, the Joint Force must simultaneously adapt and evolve 
while neither discounting nor wishing away the future reality of strife, 
conflict, and war. 
—Vice Admiral Kevin D. Scott84 
                                                 
84 Kevin D. Scott, “Joint Operating Environment 2035: The Joint Force in a Contested and Disordered 
World” (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., 2016). 
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This section outlines the history of wargaming and its benefits, and describes the 
methodology for developing the Table Top Exercise and its scenarios, which ultimately 
yielded the findings and recommendations outlined in Chapter IV.  
1. Wargaming: A Brief History 
A wargame is a simulation of a realistic scenario framed around a specific problem 
set within a given context that is ultimately designed to raise the awareness of decision-
makers about the constraints and principles of war.85 It has consistently provided military 
leaders with a cost-effective platform to identify capability gaps, encourage innovation, 
and test new ideas.86 Military history is filled with wargames; prominent among them is 
Sun Tzu’s game Wei Hai (Encirclement), which challenged players to develop new ways 
to gain a positional advantage against their opponents.87 Wargaming became increasingly 
valuable throughout history as militaries faced evolutionary, and sometimes revolutionary, 
advances in warfighting concepts as technology matured and militaries struggled to 
incorporate new variables into the way they fought. Those who did this often ensured better 
odds of victory on the battlefield. Wargaming can be traced back to 19th century Prussia 
with games such as Kriegsspiel (Wargame), developed by Prussian Lieutenant von 
Reisswitz to identify new tactics and maneuvers in response to a sudden rise of massive 
armies and the new concept of total war.88  
Starting in 1858, German Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder used 
wargaming to train his staff and develop new ways of fighting after recognizing a potential 
shift in the character of war triggered by larger battlefield formations, movement of forces 
                                                 
85 Francis McHugh, Fundamentals of War Gaming, 3rd ed. (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 2011), 
2; Peter Perla, The Art of Wargaming: A Guide to Professionals and Hobbyists (Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1990), 9. 
86 James Miller, “Gaming the Interwar: How Naval War College Wargames Tilted the Playing Field 
for the U.S. Navy During World War II” (Army Command and General Staff College, 2013), 84, 
http://www.dtic.mil/get-tr-doc/pdf?AD=ADA599136. 
87 Perla, The Art of Wargaming, 16. 
88 Miller, “Gaming the Interwar,” 11. 
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by rail, and rapid-firing artillery.89 American military leaders of World War I also 
discovered wargaming’s advantages for testing new concepts when the American 
Expeditionary Force used map exercises to develop means to overcome the static nature of 
the Western Front.90 During the technologically disruptive years in the interwar period, 
wargaming became particularly useful as militaries around the globe considered how to 
incorporate innovations such as radar, sonar, wireless communications, aircraft carriers, 
aviation, and others into their ways of fighting.91  
Today, the U.S. military continues to utilize wargames to study, anticipate and 
prepare for the challenges the future battlefield will likely present. Drawing from on-going 
Army initiatives such as Unified Quest, and its SOF complement, Silent Quest, among 
others, the TTX captures the lessons learned and best practices from these initiatives 
designed to challenge traditional approaches and uses of U.S. Army Special Forces. 
2. Scenarios and Their Utility 
You must spend time hunting for surprises [otherwise] it is difficult not to 
come up with the obvious.  
—Kees Van der Heijen, Professor of Strategic Management92 
Crafting scenarios is not about predicting the future. The scenarios presented in this 
study are not expected to come to pass exactly as described. Instead, scenarios are more 
about identifying problems and risks rather than solutions. The real utility lies in their 
ability to help military planners reduce the risks inherent in their work.93 Another important 
aspect to developing credible scenarios is the ability to describe the future operating 
                                                 
89 Benjamin Jensen, “Next War: Wargaming the Changing Character of Competition and Conflict,” 
The Strategy Bridge, March 31, 2017, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/3/27/next-war-
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92 Kees Van der Heijden, Scenarios: The Art of Strategic Conversation, 2nd ed. (Chichester, West 
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environment with sufficient analytical rigor that helps the players envision the environment 
in which they are fighting. This endeavor is enormous as difficulty and complexity 
compound as the range of the forecasts lengthen. Yet, when designed correctly, scenarios 
help to identify and acknowledge risks and potential surprises, ultimately helping to narrow 
the range of uncertainty where possible. They can also identify areas of advantage for 
belligerents and highlight potential hedges or strategic options that could enable swift 
course adjustments should the U.S. military encounter a vastly different security 
environment.94  
Crafting a compelling vision of an emerging conflict environment’s key 
characteristics can provide persuasive justification for change. This vision can also provide 
a basis for questions such as “Are U.S. Army Special Forces prepared to operate against a 
peer-level adversary in war?” and “Should U.S. Army Special Forces reorient itself or 
change the way it accomplishes its missions in such a war?” Absent such a vision that is 
often used in wargames, TTXs and the scenarios within them, senior leaders are likely to 
focus on meeting demands of existing threats, especially in times of persistent conflict as 
the United States is now experiencing.95 Coupling this likelihood with typical default 
vision that “tomorrow will look like today” highlights the usefulness of the U.S. Army 
Special Forces 2035 TTX and the importance of humbly analyzing the role of Special 
Forces against a great power adversary. 
C. DESIGNING THE “U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 2035 TABLE TOP 
EXERCISE” 
In this section, the authors describe the design of the U.S. Army Special Forces 
2035 Table Top Exercise that led to the observations outlined at the end of this chapter. 
The Table Top Exercise was completed as part of a NPS Wargame Applications course 
and was determined by the NPS Institutional Review Board to not constitute Human 
Subjects Research as found by HSR Determination dated 28 February 2017. Designing a 
TTX with sufficient analytical rigor that asks the right questions, derives meaningful 
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insights, and is capable of withstanding professional scrutiny by players and readers alike, 
required months of research, brainstorming and playtesting. The authors utilized the five 
phases of designing a wargame captured in Figure 7. 
 
 Design and Conduct of a Wargame96 
The authors also sought counsel from a wide body of experts whose research lie in 
SOF, futures, research methodology and wargaming. Both authors also obtained the 
certifications as wargaming apprentices to add rigor and credibility to the design and 
implementation of the TTX. This deliberate effort was meant to ensure the research 
questions were scoped appropriately and that the methodology selected would ultimately 
yield useful answers to those questions while avoiding previous mistakes. The Army 
Futures Study Group, USSOCOM J7, Marine Corps Warfighting Lab, National Defense 
University and select senior SOF leaders were among those most helpful to crafting the 
research questions and the TTX.  
                                                 
96 Jeffrey Appleget, “Wargaming Planning Checklist: Five Phases of Wargame Planning,” (Lecture 
Material, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey), May 2018. 
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1. Scoping the Problem 
The Table Top Exercise objective was to analyze U.S. Army Special Forces’ role 
in Large-Scale Combat Operations against a great power adversary. To ensure the objective 
was scoped appropriately and that it would yield useful answers in support of this objective, 
the authors considered key constraints that shaped the design and development of the TTX. 
The authors used United States Army Special Forces as a research scoping mechanism to 
avoid addressing the entire USSOCOM or ARSOF enterprises. U.S. Army Special Forces, 
like other SOF inherently operate in Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental and 
Multinational environments and in support of Joint Force Commander and Ambassador 
efforts. When necessary, the TTX would recognize other SOF by name, but the focus of 
the research remained squarely on U.S. Army Special Forces. 
The Table Top Exercise consisted of one full day of play conducted at the Naval 
Postgraduate School campus, and included two scenarios. Each scenario was played for 
approximately three hours, followed by a one-hour plenary session. Additional constraints 
served as scoping mechanisms in that the scenarios would remain within armed conflict 
against a great power adversary, occur within the future operating environment (2030-
2050), and focus solely on the role of U.S. Army Special Forces. Lastly, TTX was held at 
the unclassified level to allow for the inclusion of international players, who proved 
invaluable to the conduct and results of the TTX.  
2. Developing the Scenarios and the Future Operating Environment 
The scenarios used in this study took place during 2035 and described how future 
events might come to pass, and what might be their ensuing implications. The year 2035 
was selected because it is far enough into the future to get beyond the Program Objective 
Memorandum and the current programs of record outlined in the Future Years Defense 
Program.97 This was done to avoid organizational and cultural biases that may sway 
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thinking.98 Simultaneously, this helps avoid the business-as-usual and stay-the-course 
mentality that “assumes tomorrow will be only slightly different than today.”99 
The scenarios utilized in the Table Top Exercise are not meant to be predictive or 
prescriptive; rather, they were intended to identify and highlight potential changes in the 
operating environment and highlight challenges for which a military must prepare.100 The 
authors developed a future operating environment after examining key geopolitical, 
military-technical, demographic, social, economic and environmental trends from 
respectable reports which included: The National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends, the 
Chief of Staff of the Army’s Strategic Studies Group future report, the 2015 Marine Corps 
Security Environment Forecast, the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command’s G2 
Mad Scientist Initiative.101 A second critical aspect to the future operating environment 
report was a robust analysis of the belligerent’s future military capabilities, in this case, 
Russia. By combining respected government, academic, think tank and industry reports 
that analyzed Russia’s military investments with the future operating environment reports 
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aforementioned, plausible scenarios were designed with the intention of drawing out 
military implications, specifically for U.S. Army Special Forces.102  
Both scenarios examined tasks at the tactical level of war, mindful that all tasks 
could have operational and strategic implications and were in support of a strategy. Russia 
played the great power adversary for two primary reasons. First, open source data on 
Russian doctrine and way of war was not lacking. Additionally, obtaining data from 
wargames designed and facilitated by the U.S. military, academia and think tanks proved 
as useful templates for the U.S. Army Special Forces 2035 TTX. The second reason hinges 
on the time available for playing. Reducing cognitive friction for the players while creating 
a scenario that was plausible and easy to understand in one rapid reading was critical. To 
that end, the designers believed the players could envision a great power war against Russia 
much easier than one with China.103 This is not inconceivable given the significant amount 
of resources the United States devotes to NATO and the emphasis on counter-Russian 
activities the United States has maintained since the end of World War II. Additionally, 
while joint SOF units would not be incorporated into the TTX for scoping purposes, the 
scenarios would include significant host nation SOF units and resistance elements as well 
as interaction with conventional forces. This would facilitate data collection on 
interoperability and enable the authors to draw out phase zero implications in the findings.  
To adequately prepare the players for participation in a future-based Table Top 
Exercise, the facilitators developed a “Road to War” that incrementally walked the players 
into the future. The “Road to War” led into both scenarios. The first focused on traditional 
Special Reconnaissance task in support of Joint Force Entry operations, while the second 
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focused on Unconventional Warfare in a highly contested urban environment. To create 
the most dangerous scenarios, U.S. Army Special Forces elements were placed in positions 
of tremendous disadvantage in regards to location, personnel, and available combat power, 
similar to the circumstances facing Special Forces teams outlined in Chapter Two (see 
Appendix U.S. Army Special Forces 2035 Table Top Exercise for complete “Road to War” 
and scenarios).  
3. Methods and Tools 
The two major styles of wargames are system and seminar. While system wargames 
can generate quantitative data on specific weapon systems or capabilities, they are unable 
to properly capture new concepts or ideas formed by operating within a complex, abstract 
future operating environment. To obtain this type of qualitative data, seminar-style 
wargames are often used, which at its most basic form is a facilitated discussion, yet can 
also become large, complex, and vastly coordinated enterprises, such as the Army’s Unified 
Quest series currently ongoing today.104 
The authors selected a seminar-style wargame, specifically a Table Top Exercise, 
to draw out new concepts and ideas for U.S. Army Special Forces operating in the future 
operating environment against a great power. While the TTX would ultimately resemble a 
fluid dialogue among the facilitators and the players, the players were required to fill out 
Data Collection Tables to capture implications on the warfighting functions and 
Unconventional Warfare tasks throughout the respective scenarios (Tables 1 and 2). 
Specifically, the Data Collection Tables would capture implications for how the 
warfighting functions or Unconventional Warfare tasks would be achieved within the 
scenario, any associated risk, required capabilities, and “Phase Zero” implications (see 
Appendix U.S. Army Special Forces 2035 Table Top Exercise for complete maps and Data 
Collection Tables presented to players). 
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4. Player Selection  
The authors recruited a wide range of players including field grade Army, Navy, 
and Air Force Special Operations Forces officers; conventional Army, Navy, and Air Force 
personnel with European Command experience; and allied and partner special operations 
officers from the Scandinavian and Baltic regions. Each player was carefully selected based 
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upon operational experience and his or her capacity to share creative ideas in a fluid 
environment. No Personally Identifiable Information was obtained from the players during 
execution of the TTX. One facilitator and one data collector were assigned to each team, 
all of whom were certified Wargame Apprentices and/or Operations Research Analyst. The 
facilitators ensured the players maintained focus on the TTX objective and would focus the 
discussion to answer specific information requirements derived during the development 
process. The data collectors captured information requirements outlined in the Data 
Collection Management Plan, as well as digitally recorded all concepts, ideas, comments, 
and disagreements to ensure redundancy. Ultimately, the TTX consisted of 17 players 
carefully broken into two teams to effectively double the recordable observations. Each 
team was given the exact scenarios and TTX materials. The teams are listed below: 
• Team 1:  
• Facilitator: U.S. Army Special Forces Major (*Certified Wargame 
Apprentice) 
• Data Collector: U.S. Marine Corps Major (*Certified Wargame 
Apprentice; Operations Research Analyst) 
• Players:  
• 3 x U.S. Army Special Forces Majors;  
• 1 x U.S. Army Special Forces Colonel;  
• 1 x Professor of International Relations;  
• 1 x U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command Major 
(pilot); 
• 1 x U.S. Army Information Operations Major;  
• 1 x Norwegian SOF Major;  
• 1 x Finnish SOF Lieutenant Colonel;  
• 1 x Romanian SOF Major. 
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• Team 2: 
• Facilitator: U.S. Army Special Forces Major (*Certified Wargame 
Apprentice) 
• Data Collectors: 1 x U.S. Navy SEAL Lieutenant; 1 x U.S. Army 
Special Forces Major (both *Certified Wargame Apprentices) 
• Players:  
• 3 x U.S. Army Special Forces Majors;  
• 1 x U.S. Navy SEAL Lieutenant Commander;  
• 1 x U.S. Navy Intelligence Lieutenant Commander;  
• 1 x U.S. Air Force Lieutenant Colonel (Air Battle 
Manager);  
• 1 x Estonian SOF Major. 
5. Playtests  
Critical to the design and development of any wargame is the inclusion of playtests 
and full-dress rehearsals. With the individual components of the game complete, the 
playtest aims to integrate all of the pieces into a coherent functioning system.105 
Specifically, these rehearsals test the players, facilitators, products, timeline, and data 
collection plans.106 Two playtest occurred utilizing players closely resembling those used 
on the day of execution. Additionally, the authors conducted one full-dress rehearsal one 
week prior to the TTX to validate the changes made following the earlier playtests. The 
playtests allowed the facilitators and data collectors to refine products, rehearse methods 
for data collection, and, ultimately, stand prepared to execute the TTX. 
                                                 
105 David DellaVolpe et al., War Gamers’ Handbook: A Guide for Professional War Gamers 
(Newport, RI: Defense Automated Printing Service, 2013), 38. 
106 DellaVolpe et al., 38–39. 
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6. Execution of the TTX 
Players received a read-ahead packet one week before the Table Top Exercise that 
included the TTX rules, 2035 Future Operating Environment report, “Road to War” and 
two scenarios, totaling 33 pages. Additionally, the day before execution, players received 
a two-hour in-brief that covered the TTX rules, road to war and two scenario overviews. 
The facilitators hosted a question and answer session after the in-brief to clarify any issues 
and ensure each participant’s preparedness for the TTX on the following day.  
On the day of the wargame, the two teams were placed in separate planning rooms 
and began the first scenario immediately. Both teams were given the exact same scenarios, 
depicted on large laminated slides affixed to tables. The teams received two maps, but the 
use of the Internet was encouraged to assist in terrain analysis, demographic data, and 
infrastructure research. As concepts and ideas emerged from the players, the facilitator 
assisted in extracting the desired information by encouraging use of the Data Collection 
Tables provided to each team. Often, this required exploring certain courses of action in 
depth before moving on to others, and occasionally, circling back to previous ones. 
Specifically, the Data Collection Tables captured information on how the warfighting 
functions or Unconventional Warfare tasks would be achieved within the scenario, any 
associated risk, required capabilities, and “Phase Zero” implications. Additionally, the data 
collectors assisted the facilitators in keeping the teams focused on the mission, issues, and 
sub-issues outlined in the Data Collection Management Plan. Facilitators also answered 
questions posed by the team members or gave assumptions to allow the teams to continue 
idea development and prevent stalling. After the allotted 3 hours and 15 minutes, the teams 
transitioned into the second scenario and followed the same procedures listed above.  
Following completion of both scenarios, the teams met together for a one-hour 
plenary session led by the facilitators. The first half of the plenary session confirmed the 
findings of each team and captured additional insights potentially missed during the TTX. 
In the second half of the plenary, the facilitators presented the players with questions that 
focused more closely on the challenges of U.S. Army Special Forces operating in such a 
complex future operating environment. The answers from the players provided additional 
data that focused on some of the intangible factors that emerge during Large-Scale Combat 
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Operations, such as the constant balance of risk versus reward, the comfort levels of 
commanders with little control over his or her elements, and the cognitive challenges that 
exist while operating in a denied environment. Following the TTX, the authors analyzed 
the data from the Data Collection Tables, Data Collection Management Plan, and plenary 
session to present the observations in the following section.  
7. Player Observations 
In this section, the authors will present the observations from seventeen players 
during the U.S. Army Special Forces 2035 Table Top Exercise. The authors placed each 
observation into one of eight categories represented by the elements of combat power, 
doctrinally referred to as the warfighting functions.107 The elements of combat power serve 
as a recognizable intellectual framework within the military. Planners use them to organize 
tasks and systems, united by a common purpose, to accomplish missions.108 Another 
important factor in selecting a framework to present the findings was consistency in 
methodology and analysis. To address this, the players received tables organized by the 
warfighting functions to help conceptualize the military implications of the scenario and 
aid in data collection during the TTX.  
Not all player and facilitator observations had similar components or structure, as 
the authors deliberately created Data Collection Tables for the teams that allowed 
flexibility to ensure all ideas, concerns, and questions were captured. Some observations 
were questions while others were specific concerns or recommendations. Regardless of 
makeup, they were thematically placed into a particular function according to their 
warfighting characteristics. For example, a player’s observation noting the level of 
difficulty in controlling and communicating with disparate fire support elements or aircraft 
could categorically be placed into the functions of Fires or Mission Command. That same 
player could then offer a suggestion, such as a certain piece of technology, to address the 
                                                 
107 Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication 3–0: Unified Land Operations (Washington, 
DC: Government Printing Office, 2011). Six of the eight elements of combat power are referred to as the 
warfighting functions. Information and Leadership are the two remaining elements. 
108 “Department of the Army, Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0: Unified Land Operations 
(Washington, DC: Government Printing Office 2011).” 
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previously identified challenges and aid in mission execution. While some observations 
had implications across multiple functions, the authors did not duplicate them nor place 
them into more than one function. Finally, the observations herein are directly from the 
players as they navigated the military problems represented by worse case scenarios. Their 
observations do not necessarily reflect the current state of the U.S. Army Special Forces 
community or recommendations for the current or future force. However, based off the 
player observations, it is possible to extract and analyze implications to help prepare for 
such worse case scenarios. This analysis and the ensuing recommendations are found in 
the next chapter.  
a. Mission Command 
Observations regarding the Mission Command function are divided into two sub-
categories: 1) Mission Command between U.S. Army Special Forces Detachment and 
Higher Headquarters and 2) Mission Command internal to the U.S. Army Special Forces 
Detachment and its partners. Prevalent observations in both sub-categories included an 
increased emphasis on trust between elements during periods of infrequent or no 
communications; creation and comprehension of commanders’ intent; and tools and 
technologies to enable communications in a contested electromagnetic spectrum 
environment. Specific observations from the players include: 
1) Mission Command between U.S. Army Special Forces Detachment and Higher 
Headquarters  
• Expressed concern over higher headquarters’ capacity to trust 
detachments’ ability to plan and execute missions on truncated timeline 
and without frequent communications. 
• U.S. Army Special Forces should expect to fight and survive with mission 
command systems disrupted, decentralize decision-making and remove 
intermediaries between units. 
• Need for strict communication windows and contingencies in case 
windows are missed. 
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• Need for versatile tools and methods to communicate with higher 
headquarters with low probability of intercept and low probability of 
detection. 
• Request of thorough intent from higher headquarters during initial mission 
tasking to mitigate future communications that may elevate risk to mission 
and risk to force. 
2) Mission Command internal to the U.S. Army Special Forces Detachment and its 
partners 
• Trust between the detachment and its partners and their network was 
paramount to avoid compromising the purpose of the mission. 
• How do you rapidly vet new partners and their networks? What tools and 
methods are most useful? 
• Need for clandestine, mesh network to enable communication between 
dispersed detachment members and their partners. For example, players 
frequently discussed devices that could send encrypted orders and 
messages via multiple pathways such as WIFI, Global System for 
Communication (GSM) or traditional frequencies used in standard military 
radios. 
• General acceptance among players that the adversary will maintain the 
capability to disrupt or suppress some parts of a mission command 
network all of the time and all critical parts of a network some of the time. 
These effects are finite and will have limitations with regard to time and 
space. 
• What is the right balance between high-tech vs. low-tech solutions for 
communications and what are the trade-offs by picking one vs. the other? 
For example, exquisite high-tech systems may enable quicker 
understanding up and down and across echelons, but may also be more 
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vulnerable. Contrarily, low-tech, more rudimentary methods are slower 
and may degrade situational awareness at all levels but may be less 
vulnerable to intercept or detection.  
• Need for extensive tradecraft to send and receive orders and information. 
b. Movement and Maneuver 
• All movement by United States personnel into and within the area of 
operation was deemed so “high-risk” that detachment members only 
changed locations when absolutely necessary. 
• Freedom of maneuver, especially in urban areas, was restricted due to 
adversary presence and sensor networks. This made the traditional task of 
Unconventional Warfare difficult to achieve and led to the following 
observations: What are implications, challenges and opportunities of 
conducting Unconventional Warfare in an urban environment? 
Specifically, what are the implications for recruiting, training and 
organizing resistance movements within urban areas? What tools or 
methods can be leveraged by U.S. Army Special Forces or their partners to 
overcome the challenges? What impact will the cyber domain have in the 
training, recruiting and organizing of resistance elements if the traditional, 
rural Guerrilla-Base is no longer viable due to the adversary’s sensors and 
fires capability? 
• To address the difficulty and associated risks of physically maneuvering 
on the battlefield, players discussed the use of disseminated “how-to” 
videos or audible soundtracks to aid in the recruitment, training and 
employment of resistance elements since in-person activities incur 
significant risk to force and risk to mission. Examples include: how to use 
weapon systems, how to conduct reconnaissance or similar tasks, how to 
perform surveillance, how to cyber-hack, how to conduct sabotage, etc. 
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This observation was directly inspired by Steinbeck’s The Moon is 
Down.109 
• U.S. Army Special Forces relied on partner forces and networks to execute 
all tasks that required physical exposure due to lack of ability to blend into 
the local environment (ability to speak local languages, physical 
appearances). 
• If U.S. personnel maneuvered, numbers were kept at a maximum of 2–3 
persons to reduce their signature against adversary forces and sensors. 
• United States military vehicles maintained by detachments were hidden 
and never used in order to lower signature. 
• Ability to move long distance to conduct missions was severely degraded 
due to increased exposure time. 
• U.S. personnel reliant on local means of transportation or pre-positioned 
stocks to maneuver. 
c. Intelligence 
• Players requested intelligence support from higher headquarters on 
Russian S-500s. Request included photographs, capabilities, crew 
information, set-up/break-down times and procedures and common 
operation practices. How would the detachment receive this data in a 
contested environment?  
• Players felt the detachments lacked the ability to rebuild the human and 
physical infrastructure after severe degradation by the adversary. Vetting 
potential assets and recruits in a denied urban environment proved difficult 
as the traditional means to conduct these types of activities were disrupted 
                                                 
109 John Steinbeck, The Moon Is Down (Viking Press, 1942). 
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by a capable foe with robust counterintelligence and special operations 
forces. This observation led to the following questions: How do 
detachments mend, build and expand networks that are disrupted or 
destroyed by the adversary while in a denied environment during Large-
Scale Combat Operations? How quickly can a network be re-created? 
How can U.S. Army Special Forces leverage tools or methods to expedite 
the creation of a network? 
• What are the implications if detachments are unable to receive specific 
intelligence support from higher headquarters? Specifically, when they are 
tasked to identify specific targets or carry out raids, sabotage or other 
combat operations? 
• What are the counter-intelligence considerations and implications given 
the capabilities of Russian Special Operations Forces and Intelligence 
agencies? 
• Players desired the following capabilities: mask themselves against facial 
recognition and similar technologies throughout urban areas, saturate 
enemy sensors with false-hits or spoofs, hack into local closed-circuit 
cameras and temporarily disrupt power or local services to specific 
locations for small periods of time to enable operations. 
• How are the identities of the detachments members and their partners 
protected from an adversary’s intelligence organizations?  
• Players viewed the detachments as an information collection platform in 
the joint collection plan and requested detailed priority information 
requirements. 
• Large quantities of low-cost, locally procured/fabricated unmanned 
sensors played a role in most courses of action. 
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d. Fires 
• U.S. vehicles armed with rockets and heavy weapons were not used. 
• Lack of available fires and fire dominance impacted players’ risk calculus 
and perception and led to the following observations: What are the 
implications of forward detachments in a denied area without access to 
direct fire support? How does a dearth of fires impact risk perception in 
higher echelons, as well as at the detachment level?  
• Non-standard fires capabilities available to U.S. forces in a denied area 
may have implications across other warfighting functions such as 
movement and maneuver, survivability and protection. 
• Players were reliant on partner forces’ fires capabilities and flipped the 
traditional paradigm of U.S.-provided fire support upside down. This 
highlighted the following observations made by the foreign national and 
U.S. players alike: At what point does the presence of U.S. Army Special 
Forces become more of a liability than an asset if they unable to bring fire 
power to bear as demonstrated in the U.S. wars in Vietnam, Iraq, 
Afghanistan and Syria? Do the non-fires capabilities that U.S. Army 
Special Forces provide overshadow their inability to employ fires in a 
denied environment?  
e. Sustainment 
• Players were reliant on partner forces to keep them sustained by acquiring 
either local or pre-positioned stocks that would require significant upkeep 
and replenishment in phase zero operations. Items in caches and stockpiles 
would need to be the most up-to-date in terms of available technology, 
lethality, and user-interface.  
• Additive manufacturing for replacement parts, sensors and tools was 
prevalent throughout both scenarios. 
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• Players frequently mentioned an increased demand for typical SOF 
enablers such as mechanics, communicators, cyber experts and led to 
discussions on a phenomenon that the players called “the rise of the 
enabler.”  
f. Protection 
• Protection and survivability against adversary counter-intelligence agents 
and capable detection methods was prominent in the exercise. 
• How do U.S. Army Special Forces protect their cyber and signal 
infrastructure from intrusion against adversaries with capabilities equal to 
or exceeding their own?  
• What methods can U.S. Army Special Forces use to disguise themselves, 
equipment or their emissions to avoid being compromised?  
• Players used the phrase “hiding in the noise” to refer to using local 
existing communications and infrastructure to avoid detection by 
adversary forces looking for U.S. Army Special Forces elements who may 
operate systems not commonly found in the area, increasing the risk of 
intercept or detection. 
• The relative importance of armor and other active protection measures to 
that of passive protection (dispersion, cover, concealment, clutter and 
camouflage) may be more important to enhance the protection and 
survivability for U.S. Army Special Forces operating with limited support. 
• Decoys to deceive and to clutter the battlefield with false emissions will be 
important capabilities to enhance protection, survivability and maneuver 
by frustrating the adversary’s ability target and track.  
• Due to the adversary’s advanced cyber, electromagnetic and other tools, 
force protection for U.S. Army Special Forces and their partners was a 
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chief concern throughout the scenario and impacted other warfighting 
functions such and movement and maneuver, mission command and 
sustainment. 
g. Information 
• Operating and competing in the information environment can give U.S. 
Army Special Forces asymmetric advantages when outnumbered and 
isolated from support. Specifically, leveraging social media to coerce, 
disrupt and influence populations will be an important capability. 
• U.S. Army Special Forces detachments and their headquarters must be 
adept at managing uncertainty better than the adversary to understand and 
act faster in the information environment. Capabilities and requisite 
authorities at the lowest levels will enable detachments to be first in the 
information environment as opposed to reactionary. 
• Increasing the adversary’s uncertainty while minimizing that of the United 
States and its partners will place information related activities such as 
Military Deception, Military Information Support Operations at the center 
of military plans as opposed to an afterthought or lesser included to 
traditional military operations such as raids and reconnaissance. 
h. Leadership 
• The demands represented in the scenario will place a premium on leaders 
who can manage vast amounts of information and endure the likely stress 
present when operating in a denied environment against a peer adversary. 
• In an environment where a detachment is likely to be more disaggregated, 
a demand arises for more leaders capable of making decisions 
commensurate with those of an experienced detachment commander or 
operations sergeant.  
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IV. ANALYSIS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSION 
Without a dynamic body of theory, an army will follow current doctrine 
until it experiences … an “extinction event” — a catastrophic failure. The 
purpose of theory is to change current doctrine through intellect rather than 
the bloody empiricism of extinction.  
—Robert Leonhard110 
A. PURPOSE  
This final chapter begins by presenting the analysis of the observations outlined in 
the previous chapter, which were analyzed by addressing the elements of Doctrine, 
Organization, Training, materiel, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities and Policies 
(DOTmLPF-P) and their implications for U.S. Army Special Forces. Next, 
recommendations for the U.S. Army Special Forces community are presented to help 
address the gap in literature and practices that address the role of Special Forces in a war 
with a great power. The study concludes by re-visiting this knowledge gap and highlights 
the importance of closing it by encouraging efforts such as this study, and others with 
similar aims.  
B. ANALYZING THE TTX OBSERVATIONS AND THE IMPLICATIONS 
FOR SPECIAL FORCES 
The scenarios used in the Table Top Exercise were crafted to extract and identify 
the implications for and potential capability gaps within U.S. Army Special Forces as the 
players navigated the military problems presented. It is important to consider here that the 
observations and ensuing analysis were resultant strictly from the observations derived 
from scenarios within the TTX and are not intended to be taken out of the context of U.S. 
Army Special Forces operating against a great power in Large-Scale Combat Operations. 
More specifically, the scenarios centered on U.S. Army Special Forces addressing a 
Russia-based problem and thus led to Russia-based solutions considering adversary 
                                                 
110 Robert R. Leonhard, Fighting by Minutes: Time and the Art of War (Westport, Conn: Praeger, 
1994). 
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capabilities, culture, terrain, and other variables used to assess adversaries and the 
operational environment. At the same time, it is also wise to recognize that certain 
implications derived from this study could span across different military units, adversaries 
and the entire conflict continuum.  
The Joint Force conducts DOTmLPF-P analysis, which pertains to the eight non-
materiel elements in solving warfighting capability gaps.111 The Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff Instructions 3170.011 and Defense Acquisition University defines the eight 
elements as: 
• Doctrine: the way we fight (e.g., emphasizing maneuver warfare, 
combined air-ground campaigns). 
• Organization: how we organize to fight (e.g., divisions, air wings, Marine-
Air Ground Task Forces). 
• Training: how we prepare to fight tactically (basic training to advanced 
individual training, unit training, joint exercises, etc.). 
• materiel: all the “stuff” necessary to equip our forces that do not require a 
new development effort (weapons, spares, test sets, etc., that are “off the 
shelf” both commercially and within the government). 
• Leadership and education: how we prepare our leaders to lead the fight 
(squad leader to 4-star general/admiral - professional development). 
• Personnel: availability of qualified people for peacetime, wartime, and 
various contingency operations. 
• Facilities: real property, installations, and industrial facilities (e.g., 
government-owned ammunition production facilities). 
• Policy: DoD, interagency, or international policy that impacts the other 
seven non-materiel elements.112 
                                                 
111 Joint Staff J-8, “Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction CJCSI 3170.011,” January 23, 
2016, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Library/Instructions/3170_01a.pdf?ver=2016-02-05-
175022-720. The big “M” in Material denotes a new development effort that requires use of the Defense 
Acquisition System while little “m” denotes equipping forces with off the shelf or existing materials. Little 
“m” are the preferred solutions concerning time and resource commitments. 
112 Joint Staff J-8. 
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 This study does not offer a formal and comprehensive Capabilities Based 
Assessment, or “study that investigates DoD warfighting capabilities, identifies capability 
gaps and precedes DOTmLPF-P change recommendations.”113 The scope (Large-Scale 
Combat Operations) and unit of focus (U.S. Army Special Forces) in this study are much 
narrower than the entire Joint Force operating along the entire conflict continuum. 
However, the structure that DOTmLPF-P provides offers a familiar framework to military 
professionals and serves as an appropriate categorization tool to present the analysis of the 
observations from the TTX. To remain consistent with the tables filled out by the players 
during the exercise and the observation categories outlined in the previous chapter, the 
authors conducted a DOTmLPF-P and warfighting function cross-walk. This process 
added depth to the analysis by drawing out the DOTmLPF-P implications across all of the 
warfighting functions that added focus and specificity when identifying the implications, 
potential capability gaps and ensuing recommendations for the U.S. Army Special Forces 
community.  
The following three tables illustrate the crosswalk and represent the thought process 
undergone by the authors when conducting the analysis. Some intersections of DOTmLPF-
P elements and warfighting functions are redundant and are redacted from the table to avoid 
confusion or duplicative analysis. Similarly, some elements of DOTmLPF-P were 
combined to produce a single category (Leadership & Education and Intelligence & 
Information) while others were eliminated (Policy and Facilities) due to the scope of study 
or inadequate observations from the TTX. Similar to the observations in the previous 
chapter, not all implications fit precisely into one category. Some implications may have a 
narrow application while others could spread across several warfighting functions. The 
inherent value in the tables is not the method of categorization, but rather the conceptual 
thought process of understanding the implications for U.S. Army Special Forces operating 
against a peer. While they are meant to provoke thought and encourage the development 
of solving potential capability gaps, they also highlight areas where U.S. Army Special 
Forces should sustain and re-enforce existing methods, policies and tactics.  
                                                 
113 Joint Staff, “DOTmLPF-P Analysis.” 
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Several thematic trends surfaced throughout the research phase, the Table Top 
Exercise development process, player observations in Chapter III and the implications for 
U.S. Army Special Forces outlined in Table 3 above. It is from these trends that the 
recommendations are derived and conveyed to ultimately better prepare U.S. Army Special 
Forces for operating against a peer adversary. The first trend centers around a need to 
explore and develop U.S. Army Special Forces concepts and doctrine that describes how 
units will fight in the environment described throughout this study. The second trend 
focuses on aspects of leadership and professional education and development, which may 
need to adapt to enable U.S. Army Special Forces personnel to cope and thrive in 
environments that will challenge traditional methods and approaches in these areas. Many 
other observations and implications captured in this study surrounding select technologies, 
policy issues and tactics can and should drive further research and aim to fill gaps in U.S. 
Army Special Forces’ warfighting capabilities. However, doctrine and leadership deserve 
distinct emphasis as they have numerous implications across these same areas and many 
others. 
1. Expand Concepts, Doctrine and Training to account for Principal 
Tasks during Large-Scale Combat Operations 
New concepts and doctrine are meant to drive change across large organizations 
and within complex bureaucracies. This is best evidenced by doctrine’s position as the first 
element in DOTmLPF-P due to its implications across all the others. The gap in concepts 
and doctrine addressing U.S. Army Special Forces in great power wars was revealed in 
beginning of this study and the findings highlighted the need for it to be addressed. More 
specifically, more thought and detail are needed that address actions taken during these 
wars as opposed to before them, where U.S. Army Special Forces often feel more 
comfortable and are arguably optimized for.114  
                                                 
114 See Chapter II: Literature Review to see how current literature weighs SOF actions before as 
opposed to during war. 
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a. Unconventional Warfare in Dense Urban Areas 
The findings in the study suggest a greater emphasis should be placed on the 
conduct of Unconventional Warfare in dense urban areas. Operating effectively in dense 
urban areas will become increasingly important as global demographic trends indicate 
increased urbanization across the globe. Millions of people connected by low-cost 
technologies will make unrest cheap and pose significant governing challenges, increasing 
rates of conflict but also creating opportunities that U.S. Army Special Forces may 
capitalize on. Advances in sensing and fires capabilities are likely to make traditional, rural 
U.S. Army Special Forces safe-havens such as guerrilla bases or resistance training areas 
untenable. Meanwhile, forces on both sides will use complex terrain within cities to hide 
and survive. Increasingly capable adversarial counter-intelligence and counter-SOF 
capabilities, which will dwarf current capabilities employed by those faced in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, will pose significant challenges to U.S. Army Special Forces who are not 
accustomed to dealing with these threats. Concepts, doctrine and training for how U.S. 
Army Special Forces will recruit, train, organize and employ resistance networks 
(underground, auxiliaries and guerrillas) need to account for this shift. This was best 
demonstrated during the Table Top Exercise as the proliferation of connected, low-cost 
sensors in urban areas coupled with a highly capable enemy frustrated the players’ ability 
to conduct even the simplest Unconventional Warfare tasks. Additionally, players found 
maneuver, sustainment and simple survival tasks riskier than they are today.  
b. Creating and Mending Networks after They Are Disrupted 
Distinct attention should be paid to concepts, doctrine, and training to account for 
the ability to create and mend human infrastructure networks during a war. These networks 
are likely to remain critical to most U.S. Army Special Forces operations, take time to 
build, and are often created before a war breaks out. These same networks will likely be 
disrupted or severely compromised by capable foes even before U.S. Army Special Forces 
detachments arrive on the battlefield. They will also need to be re-created for U.S. Army 
Special Forces to achieve effects disproportionate relative to the size of the force, the staple 
and mantra of the regiment since its inception in 1952. Players conducting Unconventional 
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Warfare and Special Reconnaissance during the TTX demonstrated this as they relied 
extensively, and at times, exclusively on networks for sustainment, maneuver and mission 
command activities. Once these networks were compromised, the players encountered 
significant challenges completing their missions and were forced to conceive new ways to 
re-build vital networks faster than is typically required before taking any other action. 
2. Equip Leaders to Cope and Thrive 
U.S. Army Special Forces has rigorous processes to assess and select personnel 
who can operate in extreme conditions under duress. Equally rigorous training prepares 
them to achieve strategic military objectives not suitable for other units. This same ethos 
will be even more important in a war with a great power as battlefield complexities 
compound, making human decisions surrounding increasingly lethal fires, risk perception 
and managing strategic relationships more difficult. The disaggregated, lethal, remote and 
unforgiving nature of the future battlefield will demand leaders and soldiers who can make 
better decisions faster than is typically required today.  
a. Expect Decisions Typically made at Higher Levels to be made at 
Lower Ones 
Every effort should be made to develop and prepare junior leaders to assume higher 
levels of responsibility and demonstrate decision-making acumen commensurate with 
higher levels within the chain of command. Senior leaders should encourage and 
incentivize wise and prudent initiative among junior leaders while judiciously assessing 
those who demonstrate similar traits during training. At the same time, senior leaders may 
also need to re-calibrate their own metrics for risk perception and degree of delegation of 
authority to keep pace with the disaggregated nature of future operations against a peer. 
This was best captured in the TTX as players struggled to determine which level of 
command would be required to approve certain decisions or assume risk while competing 
against a dynamic and capable adversary in a degraded communications environment.  
The adage about commanders demanding more-perfect information or intelligence 
before deciding, while a disgruntled, impatient subordinate fails to understand the bigger 
picture and just awaits his orders is not new in warfare. Soldiers throughout history have 
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struggled with the same issue. Yet, the character of the future fight, as experienced in the 
TTX, seemed to exacerbate the consequences of tactical leaders delaying their decisions 
by deferring to seek approval higher up the chain of command. The illusion of enhanced 
situational awareness that current technology promulgates and mission command systems 
rely upon, failed to quell this lingering matter, all the while raising the same issues that 
soldiers and commanders have wrestled with for so long.  
The speed, depth, and lethality of the battlefield as demonstrated in the TTX, 
removed the accustomed luxuries of unbroken communications and ample time to gain 
operational clarity, forcing commanders and units into unfamiliar and uncomfortable 
situations. Examples from the TTX that placed teams at positions of tremendous 
disadvantage, saw players deliberating several scenarios: Can a detachment commander 
refuse, alter or choose a partner force if the ones that were pre-selected proved insufficient, 
unwilling or incapable? Which level of command is authorized to approve lethal or 
devastating effects if the risk to force and civilian life and infrastructure is assessed to be 
extremely high? This question compounded during the TTX as the detachments were 
operating in four disaggregated elements forcing junior detachment members to make 
decisions typically made by team, company or even battalion commanders. In the case of 
the Special Reconnaissance scenario, which demanded teams locate a key adversary rocket 
system, teams deliberated for over an hour on how to balance the risk to mission versus 
risk to force paradigm as the cost of accomplishing the mission put the lives of the entire 
detachment and their partners in jeopardy. These examples recorded in the TTX are not 
intended to be a proverbial game of “what-if” to attack the mental acuity of U.S. Army 
Special Forces leaders. However, they highlight real conversations among field grade U.S. 
Army Special Forces officers placed in trying circumstances and can help assess the 
mentality of command decisions and risk perception of leaders within the community. 
These examples can also help identify opportunities where adaptation and advancements 
in decision-making chains could be made.  
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b. Deliberately Explore Future War  
Training and professional development exercises like the TTX and similar efforts, 
which challenge traditional approaches to missions frequently conducted since 9/11, 
should be made commonplace among U.S. Army Special Forces Groups and other similar 
units. These scenarios should include complex problems against forces with capabilities 
equal to or exceeding those of the US. Being laden with endless requirements for today’s 
problems diminishes the capacity of leaders within U.S. Army Special Forces to think and 
prepare for strategically important missions that likely will not resemble the ones currently 
undertaken by the regiment. Exploring plausible future scenarios cultivates an inquisitive 
mentality that defies the mantra that tomorrow will look like today and can help yield 
meaningful results. 
Ready-to-use scenarios such as the one in the Appendix, and other similar efforts 
should be adopted for two principle reasons. First, staffs or detachments conducting 
scenario-based training offers a cost-effective means to train for unlikely but dangerous 
scenarios and can identify problems that may elude leaders who are already busy with day-
to-day requirements. For example, the TTX used to create data for this study cost zero 
dollars and took one duty day. Meanwhile, one hundred percent of the TTX participants 
stated that this was their first time experiencing a seminar-style wargame or exercise that 
focused on special operations forces in peer-level fight. Nearly all the players gained a new 
perspective on a great power war and are now armed with simple tools to prepare 
themselves and their future units for such an eventuality. Second, the conventional 
elements of the Joint Force, which often require “big M,” or, Material solutions that incur 
exorbitant financing and years to pass through the defense acquisition systems, most SOF-
specific problems encountered in this TTX could be partially mitigated with non-material 
solutions (specifically concepts and leadership/education modifications). In the same vein, 
these efforts can help identify leaders who excel in challenging scenarios while mitigating 
those who do not.  
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D. CONCLUSION   
This study conveyed that efforts to better understand U.S. Army Special Forces’ 
role during Large-Scale Combat Operations against a great power are worthy of deliberate 
exploration and thought. The supporting efforts, which make that understanding possible, 
are also important for two chief reasons. First, current concepts and doctrine addressing a 
future great power war call on U.S. Army Special Forces to achieve key military objectives 
in dangerous and denied areas against highly capable foes. Second, though not the most 
likely or desired scenario, this study argued that the likelihood of a great power war is 
increasing. Simultaneously, the operating environment is becoming more complex as the 
United States government grasps that it is competing in an increasingly multipolar world. 
Competitors in this future environment will likely have military capabilities equal to or 
exceeding those of the United States and create multiple dilemmas across all five domains 
(air, sea, land, cyber, space) where the United States has not typically been opposed on a 
peer-level.115 Fighting and winning this type of war will require efforts not seen by the 
United States since World War II, and will likely demand the capabilities that U.S. Army 
Special Forces and other similar units provide, making them central to strategic military 
plans. The cost and consequences of this war will likely be larger relative to missions like 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, which dominate United States foreign affairs 
today and force national and military leaders to devote most resources to them. These 
premises should instill a strong desire within U.S. Army Special Forces to understand the 
associated risks and requirements this type of war would demand and move the community 
to be ready for such an eventuality. They should also provoke SOF and non-SOF senior 
leaders to understand the capabilities that U.S. Army Special Forces provide as well as the 
ones they do not, or ones better suited for other units. 
This study emphasizes a measured and analytic approach to the study of and 
preparation for future warfare. It does not advocate for sweeping changes or re-directions 
for the U.S. Army Special Forces regiment writ large based on the possibility of a great 
                                                 
115 Joint Force Development, “Joint Operating Environment 2035- The Joint Force in a Contested and 
Disordered World,” 34. 
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power war and avoids an alarmist tone. Contrarily, it focuses on the least likely but most 
dangerous eventuality and is meant to drive thought on a narrow but dangerous problem. 
Research and perspectives from incubators or members of a group who are outside of the 
formal hierarchies and able to engage in speculation and exploring different ways to solve 
new problems can be key ingredients in gaining and maintaining advantages in a 
competitive world.116 In this case, the research highlighted that the skills and capabilities 
that U.S. Army Special Forces provides will still be valuable to the United States in a future 
war, but the way they provide them may change. Studies like this one should encourage 
innovation, initiate challenging conversations and spark professional debates to identify 
those changes while illuminating problems before they are encountered on the battlefield. 





                                                 
116 Jensen, Forging the Sword. In his book, Jensen uses the terms incubators to describe a key 
ingredient for creating new ideas that eventually become doctrine. The authors of the study are incubators 
in that they are members of the Special Forces community but currently outside tactical chains of 
command.  
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APPENDIX.  U.S. ARMY SPECIAL FORCES 








5 June (Reed Hall 201/202) 
1300-1500  Table Top Exercise In-Brief/Introductions/Questions 
6 June (Reed Hall 201/202) 
0830   Arrive 
0830 – 0900  Overview / Questions 
0900-1215  Scenario One 
-----------------------Working Lunch------------------- 
1215-1530  Scenario Two 
1530-1630  Plenary Session 
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A.II. TABLE TOP EXERCISE RULES AND CONSIDERATIONS 
1. The scenarios are meant to explore the role of U.S. Army Special Forces in armed 
conflict, not explore deterrence, or phase zero options, though implications for both will 
likely arise from the exercise. They represent plausible, but not likely scenarios. 
2. Accept the scenarios for what they are. Do not fight them (i.e., “This would never 
happen…,” “NATO/US would never allow that….”) 
3. Tactical problems are presented as a means to extract ideas and generate data. We are 
after your ideas, not your ability to plan a specific course of action. 
4. Try to remain on the tasks given to you in the scenarios, avoid rabbit holes that eat away 
time. Your group facilitator will assist in this, please listen to them. 
5. No group leaders. Each group will nominate a group recorder, though several members 
could/should be writing/sketching at any time. A designated data collector will be assigned 
to each team, but they are recording specific data in addition to the tables provided. 
6. Chatham House rules apply. We will record ranks and provide overviews on military 
backgrounds, but no names will be utilized when the findings are published. No data or 
ideas provided during the exercise will be attributable to you. 
7. Rank is irrelevant. Be a team player. 
8. Feel free to use the materials provided to brainstorm, record, sketch or test your ideas. 
9. The exercise is set in 2035. Technological, geopolitical and social trends and predictions 
are important to understanding this future operating environment but are ultimately 
unknowable.  
10. Push the limits of what you think is technologically possible, (Techno-optimist vs. 
Techno-pessimist) but try not to incorporate single points of failure. 
11. Push the limits of what you think is physically, culturally, morally and legally 
possible/permissible, because our adversaries do. 
12. No official breaks, coffee and food will be provided throughout the day. Go to the 
restrooms as needed. 
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13. Use of personal devices are permitted but please minimize use. Feel free to use to 






A.III.    SPECIAL FORCES IN THE BALTICS: 2035 
A. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this Table Top Exercise (TTX) is to provide insight on how U.S. 
Army Special Forces might contribute to fighting a great power adversary in Large-Scale 
Combat Operations in 2030–2050. Specifically, it will explore how armed conflict with a 
great power in that future environment will shape U.S. Army Special Forces principal 
tasks. Current U.S. Army Special Forces principal tasks, as listed in Field Manual 3–05, 
are as follows: Unconventional Warfare, Foreign Internal Defense, Security Force 
Assistance, Counter-Insurgency, Direct Action, Special Reconnaissance, Counter-
Terrorism, Counter-Weapons of Mass Destruction, and Preparation of the Environment.  
The Table Top Exercise’s future operating environment, summarized in Section B, 
is a synthesis of prominent, rigorous, and insightful forecasts that describe plausible future 
worlds and their ensuing military implications. The scenario, embedded in this future 
operating environment, focuses on a Baltic scenario set in 2035 against Russia, and does 
not aim to explore the most likely scenario, but the most dangerous. While U.S. Army 
Special Forces are optimized and prepared for activities executed during cooperation and 
competition, this TTX is designed to explore the role of U.S. Army Special Forces during 
Large-Scale Combat Operations against a great power adversary.  
B. FUTURE OPERATING ENVIRONMENT- 2035 
The risk of conflict, including interstate conflict, will increase during the 
next two decades [2017–2037] due to evolving interest among major 
powers, ongoing terrorist threats, continued instability in weak states, and 
the spread of lethal and disruptive technologies.  
—National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends, 2017 
1. Purpose 
This section describes a possible future operating environment between 2030–2050 
by exploring four separate categories: technology, international relations, state governance, 
and military implications. Through the compilation of several prominent futures studies, 
this literature review presents a different reality from what the U.S. military has become 
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accustomed to since the end of the Cold War. Analyzing alternative futures enables the 
U.S. military to take measures to address potential capability gaps in its forces, equipment, 
operating concepts, and doctrine.  
2. Summary  
The rate of technology invention, the degree to which the international system 
becomes more multipolar, and the ability of states to manage increasingly complex 
governing challenges will determine the Future Operating Environment between 2030–
2050.117 The speed and degree of convergence of these three trends will determine when, 
where, why and how great powers use force.118 Technologies such as Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), autonomous systems, and increasingly lethal weapons with extended ranges will 
make surviving and operating in this sensor-rich future environment difficult. Cyber, space 
and long-range fires capabilities will expand the battlefield.119 Russia and China, with 
access to these technologies, will likely challenge U.S. interests globally as absolute power 
diffuses and regional conflict becomes more abundant. Governments, already burdened by 
climate change, resource competition, migration and demographic trends will struggle for 
legitimacy and security. This increase in government instability is more likely to stress the 
international system, creating higher demands for stability and security operations.120 
Moves from great revisionist powers, similar to recent efforts by Russia in Ukraine and 
China in the South China Sea, will likely strain the U.S. military as each move may demand 
the U.S. government’s attention and require counter-moves. In total, conflict in and among 
states is more likely.  
 
                                                 
117 Joint Force Development, “Joint Operating Environment 2035 The Joint Force in a Contested and 
Disordered World,” July 14, 2016, http://www.jcs.mil/Doctrine/Joint-Concepts/JOE/; Chief of Staff of the 
Army’s Strategic Studies Group, “The Character of Warfare 2030–2050: Technological Change, the 
International System, and the State,” July 12, 2016. Though many factors contribute to the future operating 
environment between 2030–2050, they can be appropriately binned into these three categories. 
118 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
119 CSA Strategic Studies Group Cohort V, “Reconnaissance-Strike Battle” 
120 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
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3. Technology  
The rapid development of new technologies such as advanced computing, Artificial 
Intelligence, autonomous systems, additive manufacturing, and alternative energies, 
coupled with the proliferation of low-cost interconnected current technologies, may 
fundamentally disrupt the entire U.S. military organization. Though the rate of invention 
of new technologies is disputed, the unequal distribution of these technologies is likely to 
cause conflict as governments develop new ways to incorporate them into forms of fighting 
(i.e., innovation).121 Many sources note the development of AI may be the single most 
disruptive technology between 2030–2050 to the extent that it has implications in so many 
other areas.122 A 2013 report from McKinsey and Company, a global management and 
consulting firm, identify the most likely disruptive technologies as: 
• Mobile Internet Increasingly inexpensive and capable mobile computing 
devices and Internet connectivity; 
• The Internet of Things Networks of low-cost sensors and actuators for 
data collection, monitoring, decision making, and process optimization;  
• Advanced robotics Increasingly capable robots with enhanced senses, 
dexterity, and intelligence used to automate tasks or augment humans;  
• Autonomous and near-autonomous vehicles Vehicles that can navigate 
and operate with reduced or no human intervention;  
• Next-generation genomics Fast, low-cost gene sequencing, advanced big 
data analytics, and synthetic biology (“writing” DNA);  
• Energy storage Devices or systems that store energy for later use, 
including batteries;  
• 3D printing Additive manufacturing techniques to create objects by 
printing layers of material based on digital models;  
• Advanced materials Materials designed to have superior characteristics 
(e.g., strength, weight, conductivity) or functionality;  
                                                 
121 CSA Strategic Studies Group Cohort V, “Reconnaissance-Strike Battle” 
122 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
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• Renewable energy Generation of electricity from renewable sources with 
reduced harmful climate impact.123 
4. International System  
Prominent futures studies view the international system—defined as a system 
composed of states that shapes how, when, where, and why armed conflict occurs—on a 
spectrum with optimistic and pessimistic poles.124 As captured in the Chief of Staff of the 
Army’s Strategic Studies Group’s research on the character of warfare in 2030–2050, 
integrated and cooperative relations represent more optimistic views while fragmented and 
competitive ones lie on the other end of the scale.125 The Atlantic Council’s forecast, 
“Envisioning 2030: U.S. Strategy for the Coming Technology Revolution,” claims the 
United States is likely to be in a privileged position and maintain significant global 
influence relative to other great powers, yet will no longer be hegemonic due to the rise of 
regional competitors.126 The study goes on to say rising regional hegemons will use their 
growing influence to shape their respective regions while protecting them from outsiders, 
escalating risk of conflict. While reports claim that India, Indonesia, Japan, Nigeria, South 
Africa, and Brazil have potential to become poles in the future system, the “4+1” threat is 
the most prevalent throughout the reports (Figure A.1). 
                                                 
123 Manyika et al., “Disruptive Technologies.” Technologies, terms and definitions pulled directly 
from McKinsey report. 
124 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.”  
125 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
126 Atlantic Council, “Envisioning 2030: U.S. Strategy for the Coming Technology Revolution,” 
Atlantic Council, accessed February 15, 2018, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/reports/envisioning-2030-us-strategy-for-the-coming-




Figure A.1. The “4 + 1” Threat127 
5. State Governance  
The nation-state in the world of 2030–2050 will likely remain the power broker and 
primary actor in the international system, but any given country may be weaker 
domestically and globally than it is today.128 Power is diffusing from the state as immense 
challenges of aging societies, urbanization, resource inequality, climate change, religious 
and ethnic tensions compete for finite resources and attention (Figure A.2). Meanwhile, 
governments will compete for power with super-empowered individuals, mega-
corporations, and transnational criminal organizations who use violent and non-violent 
means to achieve their ends and who are further enabled by technology to organize quickly 
and cheaply. Strained state systems and security apparatuses will struggle to govern as 
demographic trends in more wealthy nations lead to an increasingly graying population 
                                                 
127 U.S. Army TRADOC G2, “The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future 
Warfare,” accessed January 30, 2018, http://www.arcic.army.mil/App_Documents/The-Operational-
Environment-and-the-Changing-Character-of-Future-Warfare.pdf. 
128 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.”; National Intelligence Council, Global Trends. 
The “4+1” Threat 
• Russia can be considered our “pacing threat,” and will be our most capable potential foe until 
the 2035 timeframe. It will remain a key adversary through 2050.  
• China is rapidly modernizing its armed forces and investing heavily in readiness and 
technological research. Its rapid development means that it likely will surpass Russia as our 
pacing threat sometime prior to 2035.  
• North Korea lacks the capabilities of Russia or China, but its large but outdated military, its 
credible ballistic missile force, expanding cyber capabilities, and nuclear capabilities make it a 
significant regional threat through 2025–2030. 
• Iran through 2025-2030 represents a non-nuclear regional hegemon, but is likely to develop 
nuclear weapons sometime prior to 2035. Its geography and mastery of hybrid conflict 
involving proxies, coupled with ambitious military reforms means it is likely that Iran remains 
a key concern to 2035.  
• Radical Ideologues and Transnational Criminal Organizations like ISIS, al-Qa’ida, 
Lebanese Hizballah, or Latin American drug cartels and other groups which will sprout up in 
reaction to the unfolding OE will remain difficult and capable threats through 2035, and 
probably beyond. Although individual groups will rise and fall, radical ideologues and 
transnational criminal organizations will be able to match terrorism and insurgency with 
increasing access to commercially available technologies and connections to nation states and 
criminal elements to remain viable.  
 
*From The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare by Training and Doctrine Command 





stressing national budgets while less wealthy states become increasingly young, urban and 
angry.129 These ingredients will likely increase intrastate conflict and increase the number 




The number of cities with a population in 
excess of 10 million: 
• 1950: 2 megacities 
• 1990: World is 43% urbanized 
• 2005: 20 megacities 
• 2015: World is 54% urbanized 
• 2030: 41 megacities 
• 2050: World is 66% urbanized 
*Table from CSA SSG Report: Data 
from UN, World Urbanization Report 
(2014) 
Figure 2. U.N. World Urbanization Report130 
6. Military Implications  
There is a converging consensus among prominent futures studies that significant 
discontinuities in the character of warfare are approaching rapidly.131 Certain military 
implications of these trends is aptly captured in the excerpt below from the Army’s 
preeminent futures wargame Unified Quest in 2016. 
Sensors are ubiquitous, multi-domain and capable of discreetly and 
accurately locating and targeting any and everything moving in the 
battlespace. Similarly, advances in lethal, smart weapons systems, mostly 
                                                 
129 Futures Directorate, 2015 Marine Corps Security Environment Forecast (Futures Assessment 
Division, 2015), http://www.mcwl.marines.mil/Portals/34/Documents/2015%20MCSEF%20-
%20Futures%202030-2045.pdf; National Intelligence Council, Global Trends; CSA Strategic Studies 
Group, “Character…2050.” 
130 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
131 David Fastabend, “An Advanced Engagement Battlespace: Tactical, Operational and Strategic 
Implications for the Future Operational Environment | Small Wars Journal.” 
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autonomous, and munitions enable precision, real-time, effective attack and 
destruction of discrete targets in all domains throughout the battlespace. 
Integrating these sensor / shooter combinations will be holistic, integrated 
mission command systems that ensure real-time situational understanding, 
decision making and execution, much of which will be autonomous.  
—Jim Greer132 
Put simply, advanced military capabilities will likely shape the battlefields of 2030–
2050. Military power and shaping will likely rest on the proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
ballistic missiles, and precision-strike technologies, all enhanced by cyber capabilities.133 
Increasingly, combined arms fighting will expand to include electronic, cyber and other 
effects.134 Due to increased connectivity, battlefield events will affect the global 
information environment even faster than they do today. A premium will be placed on the 
fight for information while survival and victory will go to those who understand and act 
faster.135 Some have labeled events on this future battlefield as “Advanced Engagements,” 
which can be described as: 
• “… compressed in time, as the speed of weapon delivery and their 
associated effects accelerate enormously;  
• … extended in space, in many cases to a global extent, via precision long-
range strike and interconnectedness, particularly in the information 
environment;  
• … far more lethal, by virtue of ubiquitous sensors, proliferated precision, 
high kinetic energy weapons and advanced area munitions;  
• … routinely interconnected—and contested—across the multiple 
domains of air, land, sea, space and cyber;  
                                                 
132 Jim Greer, “Multi-Domain Battle Concept Paper - Breaking Out of Paralysis: Hutier Tactics in 
2050,” Unpublished Paper, 2016. 
133 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
134 CSA Strategic Studies Group Cohort V, “Reconnaissance-Strike Battle” 
135 CSA Strategic Studies Group Cohort V, “Reconnaissance-Strike Battle” 
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• … interactive across the multiple dimensions of conflict, not only 
across every domain in the physical dimension, but also the cognitive 
dimension of information operations, and even the moral dimension of 
belief and values.”136 
Innovation—the addition of new technologies into ways of fighting—will be 
paramount as adversary capabilities will pose significant challenges to U.S. efforts as 
dominance in any domain may no longer be feasible. Disruptive technologies, or 
technologies so advanced that U.S. doctrine is re-shaped to take full advantage, will arrive 
at varying speeds and densities (Figures A.3 and A.4).137  
 
Figure A.3. U.S. Army Projections of “Game Changers” through 2035138 
 
                                                 
136 Fastabend, “An Advanced Engagement Battlespace” 
137 CSA Strategic Studies Group, “Character…2050.” 
138 U.S. Army TRADOC G2, “The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future 
Warfare.” 
 
Potential Game Changers through 2035 
Evolutionary technologies that, if matured and fielded, can provide a decisive edge over an adversary 
unable to match the capability or equal the capacity. 
Article I. Advanced ATGM & MANPADS - Proliferate more rapidly than Active Protection 
systems develop, putting armored vehicles and helicopters at risk 
Article II. Robotics – 40+ countries develop military robotics with some level of autonomy 
Article III. Space – 50+ nations operating in space. Increasingly, congested and difficult to 
monitor. PNT at risk  
Article IV. Chemical Weapons – Nontraditional agents developed to defeat detection and 
protection capabilities 
Article V. Camouflage, Cover, concealment, Denial & Deception (C3D2) – Creates uncertainly 
and challenges multi-discipline intelligence 
Article VI. Cannon/Rocket Artillery – Long-range artillery, hardened GPS munitions defeat 
jamming. Point air defense defend against PGM 
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Figure A.4. U.S. Army Projections of “Game Changers” through 2050139 
C. ROAD TO WAR 
Beginning in 2019, determined to follow through on campaign promises, President 
Donald Trump gradually reduced the U.S. military presence within Syria and Iraq, leaving 
a minimal footprint consolidated in Iraq and Turkey. As the U.S. withdrew from the Syrian 
conflict, Russia, bolstered by what it perceived to be a strategic victory, vowed to 
reinvigorate its efforts to “protect ethnic Russian and Slavic populations from Islamic 
extremists, Western influence, and corruption.” Russian meddling in the 2020 U.S. 
presidential elections surpassed what occurred in 2016 and the resulting fallout all but 
severed what was left of the strained relationship between the United States and Russia. 
Unperturbed, the Russians continued to seed discontent in the United States by exploiting 
domestic issues and inciting nationwide protests. Simultaneously, President Vladimir Putin 
ordered the modernization of the Russian military with a target completion date of 2030. 
While the United States maintained its “Look East” policy toward China, Russia noticed 
and took advantage.  
                                                 
139 U.S. Army TRADOC G2, “The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future 
Warfare.” 
Potential Game Changers through 2050 
• Laser and Radio Frequency Weapons – Scalable lethal directed energy which can counter aircraft, 
UAS, Missiles, Projectiles, Sensors and Swarms 
• Swarms – Leverage autonomy, robotics, and artificial intelligence to generate “global behavior with 
local rules” for multiple entities – either homogeneous or heterogeneous teams.  
• Rail Guns and Enhanced Directed Kinetic Energy Weapons (EDKEW) – Non-explosive 
electromagnetic projectile launchers provide high velocity/high energy weapons.  
• Energetics – Provides increased accuracy and muzzle energy.  
• Synthetic Biology – Engineering and modification of biological entities has potential weaponization.  
• Internet of Things – Linked internet “things” create opportunity and vulnerability. Great potential 
benefits already found in developing U.S. systems also create a vulnerability.  
• Power – Future effectiveness depends on renewable sources and reduced consumption.  
 
*From The Operational Environment and the Changing Character of Future Warfare by Training and Doctrine 
Command (TRADOC) G2 (2017) 
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In 2028, civil society groups within Russia launched a movement seeking to rebuild 
the “tsarist” state. The union movement, fueled by state-sponsored media, corrupt business 
leaders, and other nefarious elements linked to the Russian government, grew rapidly and 
saw a resurgence in the Soviet-era mindset of the Russian people. Minsk immediately fell 
victim to the movement’s influence and Russia quickly forced a political union with 
Belarus, absorbing the state. Additionally, places like Odessa, which resisted Russian 
intervention and sought protection by leaning westward during the 2014 Ukraine crisis, 
found themselves amid rampant corruption. Odessa became a beacon for the pro-Russian 
movement, a “lesson that was learned the hard way” that reinforced the movement’s claims 
that siding with the west only led to corruption, moral bankruptcy, and an unjust society. 
After the annexation of Odessa, the Russians gradually absorbed political influence 
that reached westward across southern Ukraine, all the way to the Transnistria region in 
eastern Moldova. 
The international community, awakened by outcries from Romania, Moldova, 
Poland, and the Baltic states, responded. On the surface, the pro-Russian movement 
appeared non-violent and therefore left little for the international community to do. 
However, the newly elected U.S. President, wanting to show his resolve, stated that further 
incursions by Russia into sovereign nation’s borders would be met with a response. As the 
rhetoric between the two leaders grew increasingly hostile, the world once again found 
itself teetering on the edge of war. NATO felt the press of time and the U.S. military began 
looking earnestly at the possibilities of defending a NATO ally against a Russian invasion 
by invoking Article V. Reminiscent of 2015, the U.S. military sent rotational forces to 
Poland, increased equipment and ammunition depots in Europe, and reinvigorated its 
commitment to NATO allies. In addition to two Armor Brigades, the United States 
deployed a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) to northeast Poland to pre-emptively deny 
Russia’s ability to launch long-range precision strike munitions, intelligence surveillance 
reconnaissance (ISR), and disrupt the integrated air defense system in Kaliningrad. The 
Baltic countries readdressed defensive plans and prepared their armed forces for 
mobilization. The NATO Response Force was placed on alert. But Russia, having tested 
the resolve of Europe and the United States, made no additional moves to incite further 
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international reaction. Six years later, in 2034, although the political environment returned 
to normalcy, U.S. forces maintained a continuous presence in Poland. 
The Latvian crisis began in 2035. The Latvian banking system collapsed as a result 
of bad loans to Russian banks connected to organized crime syndicates. As the economic 
crisis erupted and unemployment rose, attacks on ethnic Russians occurred amidst violent 
protests, resulting in several deaths on both sides. The Russian government immediately 
promised protection for all ethnic Russians in the Baltic region. Exploiting the opportunity, 
Russian “trolls” saturated media outlets with phony stories; cyber-attacks compromised the 
Latvian infrastructure, and Latvian military and civilian communications experienced 
intermittent problems and random power surges. Russian forces began massing on the 
border and “little green men” appeared in eastern Latvia. Reports on social media showed 
trains that originated in Russia stopping in Latvia to offload heavy equipment. Mortar fire 
rained down on the Riga airport, roadblocks were established at the major river crossings, 
and chaos erupted at the port with reports of remote vehicles and missiles firing from 
hidden shipping containers sinking multiple Latvian patrol boats and merchant ships. The 
air lines of communication quickly became contested as surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) 
brought down multiple Latvian aircraft. The self-proclaimed Orthodox Christian Brigade 
sabotaged approximately 30% of the Latvian military equipment at key military depots and 
seized television stations to control any broadcasting. The Latvian land and air defense 
forces deployed to defensive positions to conduct area defense, but were quickly 
overwhelmed by highly effective irregular troops with significant ISR and indirect fire 
support originating from Russia. The Orthodox Christian Brigade supported by “irregular 
units” established checkpoints along the river dividing Riga while T-14 tanks began to 
enter the city. It soon became clear to the neighboring NATO countries that this was a 
deliberately planned Russian invasion of Latvia with the use of “irregular units” meant to 
buy time. Unfortunately, it was too late for the rest of the Baltic countries. 
In less than 24 hours, Russian conventional forces also moved west into Lithuania 
from former Belarus, securing lines of communication, major infrastructure, and entering 
the cities of Vilnius and Kaunas. Simultaneously, forces moved west across Estonia, 
securing Tallinn, and secured the land-bridge to Kaliningrad. Within 48 hours, the world 
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witnessed the execution of the Russians’ military exercise “Zapad 17” that occurred in 
2017 and simulated a shock attack against NATO. Russia immediately claimed it rescued 
ethnic Russians across the Baltic region, and restored order on behalf of the Baltic people. 
Predicting a fait accompli, Russia immediately exported the narrative that it had acted 
legitimately and that a war over the Baltic territories was not in anyone’s best interest.  
As predicted, the U.S. military and NATO had little time to react. As the North 
Atlantic Council attempted to hold an emergency meeting at the beginning of the crisis, 
Russian forces were already driving toward Riga and Tallinn. The Very High Readiness 
Joint Task Force consisting of 5,000 troops supported by air, sea, and special operations 
forces, began pre-deployment preparations but were unable to deploy before Riga and 
Tallinn were isolated by Russian forces. The larger NATO Response Force of about 30,000 
troops also began mobilizing, but found itself slowed by Russian cyber-attacks on 
European civilian and military infrastructure. Even individual soldiers reported 
compromised personal bank accounts, social media phishing attacks, and threats directed 
toward themselves and their families on social media. United States and NATO Ballistic 
Missile Defense, consequence management, and strategic mobilization plans were 
triggered. Additionally, concerns over a limited nuclear exchange emerged and were 
quickly followed by panic across the United States and Europe as social media posts of 
questionable origin claimed an imminent Russian first strike with nuclear weapons. While 
cyber-attacks reached across the globe, the stock market began to plummet, and 
altercations began to occur over food, fuel, and water.  
While the armed forces of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania attempted to defend 
against the onslaught, each country’s national civilian defense force activated and began to 
fight. While Russian forces easily targeted the uniformed armed forces, the different 
national militias, armed through prepositioned stocks of man-portable air defense systems 
(MANPADS), anti-tank mines, anti-tank rockets, small arms, and advanced sensors, 
created numerous problems for the Russian lines of communication, logistics, and 
maneuverability. While the Russians isolated the major cities, captured infrastructure, and 
established major supply routes within Baltic region, these areas were far from secure. The 
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Russians faced frequent attacks by partisan forces throughout the Baltics and implemented 
effective counter-insurgency (COIN) and counter-unconventional warfare (C-UW) tactics. 
At the time of the Russian incursion, the majority of U.S. forces were stationed in 
Poland. The U.S. military maintained one Multi-Domain Task Force and two Armored 
Brigades in Poland. These forces immediately received guidance to assist Poland in 
reinforcing its northern and eastern borders, but not to engage Russian forces unless fired 
upon. Additionally, four U.S. Army Special Forces Operational Detachments – Alpha 
(SFODAs) were forward deployed in Lithuania and Latvia at the time of the Russian 
incursion. The SFODAs and their partners reduced their signatures to survive, but were 
able to maintain communications with their headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. These 
SFODAs, after continuous rotational deployments to the Baltics for the past 20 years, had 
established strong networks within the Baltic countries. Over the years, “go-to-ground” 
plans, safe houses, caches, area assessments, and target packets were developed and 
disseminated among NATO SOF and partisan forces. New technology and Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures were implemented along the way. In contrast to the hopes of 
Russia, the North Atlantic Council was decisive and invoked Article V, deciding to 
mobilize forces against Russia to reestablish the status quo. 
In the last 18 years, the U.S. military has made significant advancements in:  
• The benefit of more dispersed, autonomous small units 
• The criticality of mobile anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) “bubbles” of 
dominance, temporary in time and space, when under adversary 
overmatch A2/AD spheres  
• Semi-autonomous supply delivery and robotic supplementation to the 
lowest levels for logistics support, allowing small units to range further 
• Counter-drone unmanned aerial system (UAS) that can eliminate targeting 
and ISR drone systems  
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• Enhanced communications that allow direct sensor-to-shooter links and 
encrypted communications from the lowest tactical level to formation 
level 




A.IV.     SCENARIO 1: ENABLE JOINT FORCE ENTRY /  
SPECIAL RECONNAISSANCE 
It has been 100 days since the Russian incursion into Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania. 
Having met little resistance, conventional Russian forces are now predominantly 
conducting static security around key infrastructure such as government facilities, strategic 
APOD/SPODs, while SOF and other specialized units are conducting counterinsurgency 
and influence operations in populated and rural areas against resistance forces. A robust 
integrated air defense system across the entire region with mobile fire units and long-range 
fire systems provides ample defensive and offensive fires. Russia maintains air and sea 
superiority though coalition aircraft have penetrated the airspace using advanced stealth-
sensor platforms in an attempt to map the Electromagnetic Spectrum, and sometimes 
conducting limited strikes. The Baltics are considered denied territory to U.S. and coalition 
forces though 100% of the territory is not under complete control by the Russians. Most of 
the host nation conventional military capabilities were immediately destroyed in the initial 
days of battle, however, unconventional resistance from mainly host nation special 
operations forces and irregular civil defense groups are spread throughout the region and 
maintain limited ability to conduct sabotage, reconnaissance and other similar tasks, though 
they are under constant threat. While on Joint Combined Exchange Training events, 
four SFODAs were forced into hiding to reduce signature, survive and report. Meanwhile, 
U.S. and coalition forces have built up combat power in Germany and Poland as they plan 
to initiate major offensive combat operations in 30 days to return the situation to the 
status quo. 
Enabling sufficient ground and air combat power staged in Poland to maneuver 
north toward Riga and Tallinn requires complex phased operations to establish temporary 
windows of opportunity to conduct key military operations (tested since 2018) due to 
Russia’s dominance in both short, medium and long-range fires and early warning systems 
(anti-access area denial). Several of these “island-hopping” campaigns have enabled 
coalition forces to maneuver as far as they have to the eastern Polish border.  
High-level policy negotiations in the last 100 days have resulted in the following 
conditions: 
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• Russian forces will not operate across the border with Poland 
• Coalition forces will not operate across the border with Kaliningrad 
• No use of CBRNE 
A. MILITARY OBJECTIVES  
As coalition ground and air forces prepare to cross the Lithuanian border, a 
Multidomain Task Force (MDTF) has been ordered to establish a temporary lodgment IVO 
Klaipeda Lithuania on D-Day (30 days from now), to place effects on key targets including 
major headquarters, fire batteries and other sensors, conduct limited IO and cyber 
operations to enable ground and air forces to begin moving north the same day. National 
assets and another Poland-based MDTF can positively identify, range and affect Russian 
fire systems and sensors in the vicinity of Kaliningrad to facilitate the infiltration. However, 
the coalition has been unsuccessful in positively identifying the Russian SAM and other 
ground-based long-range fires systems in vicinity of Klaipeda due to their advanced 
camouflage and deception techniques. The MDTF plans to infiltrate a small advance party 
via three C-17 sorties into Klaipeda to establish a temporary lodgment, but only after the 
enemy systems have been found and destroyed with coalition fires. In addition to 
requesting continued support from national assets, the CJTF-R commander has requested 
the U.S. Army Special Forces teams facilitate Joint Force Entry by locating a S-500 battery 
last seen in vicinity of Klaipeda. All national, JTF and SOF assets are available for request. 
B. YOUR MISSION 
1. Situation  
Your TTX team represents the U.S. Army Special Forces team closest to Klaipeda. 
You have been behind enemy lines for 100 days mainly trying to avoid detection and 
survive since the Russians invaded the Baltics during your JCET. Your personnel, weapons 
and equipment (see Order of Battle) remain intact but are distributed to reduce signature. 
Moving around is high risk, but possible. Over half of your partner Lithuanian SOF 
company have been KIA, others are alive and in hiding, conducting limited sabotage 
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operations with their remaining stocks. Your team and the three others in the Baltics have 
mostly been reporting Russian activity to EUCOM headquarters when possible, though all 
communications runs a high risk of intercept and detection. You also advise the Lithuanian 
SOF and civil defense groups in their operations, as they activated their irregular defense 
plans 100 days ago. Limited kinetic strikes from resistance forces against soft Russian 
targets have been effective in the tactical sense, but have be met with severe counterattacks 
and harsh population control measures. Russian Counter-UW tactics have been very 
effective eliminating over 75% of the human infrastructure in vicinity of Klaipeda. Your 
most recent message from your headquarters is as follows: 
2. Guidance 
You have 30 days to locate a S-500 battery in vicinity of Klaipeda in order to enable 
targeting by coalition fires. Your efforts will enable the MDTF to infiltrate, with the main 
conventional assault following shortly afterwards. 
*Of note: Roughly 25% of the population in Klaipeda is ethnic Russian. In total, 
1/3 of the city are Russian sympathizers. Robust Counterintelligence and Counter-UW 
efforts aided by advanced electronic eavesdropping from GRU/Spetznaz is effective. 
Conventional units conduct routine patrols, flash checkpoints and periodic raids of 
resistance strongholds though the main effort is to win the support of the populace. The 
city’s essential services, Internet and commerce sector is fully operational, though likely 
monitored and influenced by the Russians. 
3. Instructions  
There may be several ways to accomplish the mission. After brainstorming and 
deliberation, select one option and consider the implications of the warfighting functions 
using the table. Repeat the process for the next option. Your facilitator will help with this 
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• Motorized Rifle Brigade “Mikhail Kutuzov”: 4,200 troops augmented
with T-14s, T-15s tanks, 2S19 Msta 152 mm SP howitzers, Verba SAMs,
ZALA drones
• Attack/Lift Squadron (-) “Boris Vorobyov”: 24 x Kamov Ka-50/52 attack
helos with sufficient lift to transport 1 infantry company in one turn.
• Spetsnaz Battalion (-) “Alexander Chernyshyov”: 300 troops in light
vehicles, Verba SAMs, ZALA drones
• S-500 Battery: 8 launch vehicles, 1 CP truck, 3 radar trucks
Russian artillery units can fire conventional, cluster, anti-armor, localized EMP, 
and parachute EW rounds. Russian rocket launchers can fire conventional, localized EMP, 
parachute EW, and thermobaric rounds. Russian T-14 and T-15 vehicles have active 
defenses against anti-tank missiles and 35% can be optionally manned. Russian SOF light 
vehicles are extremely maneuverable, equipped with localized SIGINT capability and have 
radio direction finding capability and have mastered tipping/queuing TTPs with their 
organic ZALA drones that are capable of carrying a 20kg payload.  
AIR: 
Russian Expeditionary Aerospace Force West: 
• Fighter Squadron “Anatoly Kornukov”: 24 x Sukhoi PAK FA stealth
fighters
• Fighter-Bomber Squadron “Vladimir Mikhaylov”: 24 x Sukhoi Su-34
fighters-bombers
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• Bomber Squadron “Aleksandr Zelin”: 24 x Tupolev Tu-22M  
• Attack Squadron “Boris Vorobyov”: 24 x Kamov Ka-50/52 attack 
helicopters  
• Drone Squadron “Golden Horde”: 24 x Sukhoi/KRET attack/EW UASs 
Russian fighters and bombers carry K-77 radar-guided missiles, K-74 heat-seeking 
missiles, laser- and satellite-guided bombs, thermobaric bombs, Kh-35 anti-ship missiles, 
and Kh-58 anti-radiation missiles. Not all air platforms are available 100% of the time in 
the airspace over the Baltics, as range and fuel considerations still exist. However, ground 
units can request support during operations. 
SEA: 
Russian Baltic Sea Flotilla:  
• 3 x Battlecruiser Pyotr Velikiy, with 2 x 130 mm guns, 20 heavy anti-ship 
missiles, 268 air defense missiles, heavy torpedoes, anti-submarine 
rockets, 3 x ASW helicopters 
• 3 x Destroyer Admiral Ushakov, with 4 x 130 mm guns, 8 Moskit SSMs, 
24 Shtil SAMs, AK630 guns, 533 mm torpedoes 
• 3 x Frigate Admiral Gorshkov, with 4 x 130 mm guns, 8 Kh-35 SSMs, 32 
Tor SAMs, AK-630s, 533 mm torpedoes 
• 3 x Attack submarine Krasnoyarsk, with 650 mm & 533 mm torpedoes, 
Onix and Kalibr SSMs 
Russian ships are known to carry unidentified robotic submersibles in the torpedo 
tubes, and armed rotocraft drones in their aircraft hangars.  
SPACE: 
Anti-satellite capability from domestic Russian launch facilities 
CYBER: 
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Fancy Bear Cyber Brigade, with offensive and defensive capabilities 
2. Coalition
LAND:  
In Lithuania and Latvia: 
4 x U.S. Army Special Forces ODA’s: The U.S. Army Special Forces elements 
maintain the following force posture: 
• Equipped with highly maneuverable all-terrain vehicles armed with
rockets and SAMs.
• Advanced communications equipment including stealth IP, and
chameleon-like ability to hide in the noise to minimize jamming and DF
• Limited additive manufacturing (3D printing) capability though raw
materials are scarce
• Exoskeletons (1/per man) for dismounted operations
• Organic UAS capability
Lithuanian SOF: (Sustained heavy casualties during the invasion before 
disaggregating to avoid being destroyed) 
• 1 Bn equivalent (300 pax)
• Roughly 20 pax partnered with your ODA
• Small teams of Lithuanian SOF maintain some contact with NATO HQ
and are equipped with small arms, anti-armor, mortars, light tactical
vehicles
Lithuanian Civilian Defense Force: (Divided into region units ~15,000 pax total) 
• Capable of massing groups ranging from 3–50 pax in various locations
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• Roughly 200 IVO Klaipeda conducting their day to day jobs and avoiding 
detection 
Irregular defense group typically armed with small arms, anti-armor, anti-personnel 
mines, anti-tank mines, mortars, variety of small tactical transport vehicles. Increased 
engagement in the region with U.S. and NATO SOF since 2018 has enhanced their 
irregular war fighting capabilities and added new tools to their arsenals such as sensors, 
clandestine network formations (safe houses, caches, personnel recovery, reconnaissance) 
and SAMs. 
U.S. Army Special Forces Group: ~2500 PAX (Stuttgart, GE) 
• 1x HHC, 3x Line Battalions, 1x Special Warfare Battalion, 1x Support 
Battalion 
• 1x Crisis Response Element (2x troops/6x ODAs), 54x ODAs (48x line 
ODAs), 12x ODGs, 1x RSE 
The ODA is still the main operational element within U.S. Army Special Forces, 
though technological and training advancements have expanded their capabilities to 
include: 100% Military Freefall qualified, digital language translators, small-scale additive 
manufacturing, organic ISR to include small autonomous air and ground systems used for 
sensors, sustainment. Exoskeletons and human performance enhancements enable long 
movements and sustenance. The most influential advancements have been made within the 
electro-magnetic spectrum enabling clandestine communications, limited spoofing and 
deception operations and tactical jamming capabilities. 
Multidomain Task Force: Personnel ~2500 (Warsaw, Poland) 
• 1xHHB, 1x ADA Bn, 1x MLRS Bn, 1x Rotary Wing Bn, 1x BSB, 1x EW 
Detachment 
• Mobility: Rotary Wing A/C 
• Armament: Patriot, MLRS, Avenger 
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The MDTF is a composite entity formed to defeat adversary Anti-Access, Anti-
Denial systems. It is a regimental-sized element with fires, information, and cyber 
capabilities, with the potential to be used as both offensive and defensive weapons. This 
concept became a permanent entity within the U.S. military arsenal approximately 10 years 
ago and has varied in sized over the years given the constant evolution in technology. This 
entity is deployed and employed as the initial effort to defeat systems, then to have follow-
on forces flow into theater once select enemy systems are defeated. The main effort of this 
entity is its cyber capability, which can effectively defeat many of the electronic-based 
systems that most of the world’s military is dependent upon. Additionally, its social media 
capability that offers predictive analysis provides target direction and development. 
AIR 
Allied Air Expeditionary Force 
• 12 FGR4s Typhoons (RAF) with Brimstones and Paveway IV
• 24 F-35As; 4 x KC-46As; 12 KC-130Js
• The 404 Air Expeditionary Wing will be equipped with MQ-1, C-17,
MC130, and CV-22 aircraft, while the 457 Air Expeditionary Group will
be equipped with A-10, AC-130, B-1, B-2, B-52, F-15, & F-22 aircraft.
US Army Aviation Group Eagle Gollum (Warsaw, Poland) 
• 6 x MH-47s, 12 x UH-60s, 6 x AH-64s with 20 mm guns and Hellfires, 12
x MQ-1C Gray Eagles with Hellfires
SPACE 
Commercial surge capability from SpaceX: small-satellite launch-on-command 
CYBER 
Offensive and defensive cyber teams from U.S. 2nd Army, NSA and GCHQ 
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A.V. SCENARIO 2: UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN RIGA 
It has been 30 (D+60) days since the coalition forces pushed the Russians across 
the Lithuanian border. Russia maintains control of Kaliningrad, Latvia and Estonia. Russia 
and NATO suffered heavy casualties during major combat operations in Lithuania. 
Currently, no conventional coalition forces operate in Latvia with the Russians 
reciprocating similarly in regard to Lithuania. Fierce conventional fighting has stalled as 
political back channels indicated a possible Russian tactical nuclear escalation if the fight 
pushed into Latvia. The National Security Council through the Secretary of Defense and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff are requesting EUCOM and the JTF develop alternative strategies for 
militarily pressuring the Russians without escalating to nuclear exchange. 
Meanwhile, Russia continues to lobby the international community for support as 
they maintain that the Baltics is their sovereign territory. The United States, NATO and the 
international community condemn Russia’s revisionist actions, though are forced to 
recognize Russian immense military power in the region. However, slowing NATO’s 
counter-attack came at a high cost militarily and politically for Russia as this unexpected 
war came during a massive domestic economic downturn due to collapse of currency, 
increased bond yields and domestic unrest. 
Mounting political pressure abroad and domestically spurs the Russian president to 
secure Latvia quickly, appeasing his nationalist constituency and showing Russian might 
on the international stage. United States and coalition intelligence estimate that the 
Russians have 12–18 months to pacify scattered resistance pockets in Latvia before they 
lose prestige at home and abroad. Riga is central to their pacification strategy. Key 
infrastructure such as government facilities, APODs/SPODs are protected though the focus 
is winning the populace through information operations, crushing resistance uprisings, and 
conducting counter-unconventional warfare operations. Robust IADs and operational fires 
stretch countrywide and the entire country is designated “denied” by coalition military 
planners. 
Unwilling to accept Russia’s claim of the Baltics and looking for a new strategy 
that avoids nuclear war and expedites Russian withdrawal, the U.S. government has 
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designated Unconventional Warfare as the strategic option. Key to this is making the 
Russian military occupation of Riga untenable. Surviving in what is essentially a “no-
man’s land,” U.S. Army Special Forces and their partners operating in the region for six 
months have collapsed to Riga, as rural areas leave them too vulnerable. Teams are largely 
disaggregated and “hiding in the noise” as adversary advanced sensors and robust 
Counterintelligence networks attempt to locate them. Significant challenges for the teams 
have been in their ability to sustain, organize, build up and employ, as well as other U.S. 
Army Special Forces principal tasks such as Direct Action and Special Reconnaissance 
against military targets. Though no conventional forces are present, forward U.S. Army 
Special Forces teams, their partners and several interagency teams have the full weight of 
the U.S. and coalition governments behind them.  
A. YOUR MISSION  
1. Situation  
Your TTX team represents one of the two SFOD-As currently operating within 
Riga. You have been placed in charge of planning, coordinating, and executing the UW 
campaign in Riga and have full authority over all USSF within the city. Your SFOD-A has 
survived for six months behind Russian lines, adapting quickly and learning to maneuver, 
communicate, and sustain in a denied environment. During the coalition offensive into 
Lithuania, your Detachment, NATO SOF partners, and resistance members were able to 
develop, refine, and apply TTPs to successfully delay enemy reinforcements and harass 
enemy Lines of Communication, although it came at the loss of your senior 18E 
Communication Sergeant. Conventional fighting stalled near the Latvian border as the 
Russians threatened the use of tactical nuclear weapons. With a significant decline in 
kinetic combat operations in Latvia and having expended a majority of the pre-positioned 
ammunition and weapon stocks, your SFOD-A was directed to reduce its signature, 
retrograde toward Riga, and begin establishing networks. Since infiltrating Riga, your 
SFOD-A now operates in four separate teams, often co-located with NATO SOF, and 
occasionally other resistance members, living across multiple different safe sites within the 
city limits. Numerous pockets of resistance members, ranging anywhere from 1–4 people, 
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are scattered throughout the city. Your SFOD-A and its partners have established 
mechanisms to ensure basic sustenance, limited force protection, and rudimentary 
communications techniques.  
2. Guidance 
You are to conduct Unconventional Warfare within Riga to make the Russian 
military occupation of the city untenable, eventually forcing a Russian military withdrawal.  
*Of note: The daily operations and infrastructure for the city of Riga continue to 
function with limited to moderate Russian military oversight. While trade and port 
activities were shut down during the first 100 days of the conflict, these activities recently 
returned to a level of normalcy. Minimal population control measures are employed to 
increase Russian chances of pacification; however, the Russians have temporarily utilized 
stricter methods in response to insurgent activity. The population of Riga is made up of 
55% Latvian, 35% ethnic Russian, and 10% other.  
*U.S. Army Special Forces and other government agencies activities north of the 
border is clandestine and non-attributable after the Russians threatened a tactical nuclear 
response. This has implications on U.S. Army Special Forces’ ability to leverage 
operational fires, sustainment and other warfighting functions originating outside Latvia. 
3. Instructions 
Given what you know about the future operating environment, the Situational 
Template and threat capabilities discuss and brainstorm how you would achieve the UW 
tasks while filling out the table. Be sure to include all elements of a resistance as you 
develop ideas (Underground, Auxiliary and Guerillas). See table on next page. 
Fill out as many tasks as you can. If you get stuck, move on. It does not have to be 
done in order.  
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C. ORDER OF BATTLE 
1. Russia 
• Two (2) Motorized Rifle Brigade “Mikhail Kutuzov”: 4,200 troops 
augmented with T-14s, T-15s tanks, 2S19 Msta 152 mm SP howitzers, 
Verba SAMs, ZALA drones 
• One (1) Spetsnaz Brigade “Alexander Chernyshyov”: 1,000 troops in light 
vehicles, Verba SAMs, ZALA drones 
• Attack/Lift Squadron (-) “Boris Vorobyov”: 24 x Kamov Ka-50/52 attack 
helos with sufficient lift to transport 1 infantry company in one turn. 
Russian forces conducting COIN, specifically the Spetsnaz and GRU elements, 
utilize a combination of SIGINT, HUMINT, social media exploitation, sensors, and ISR to 
counter resistance elements. While Russian Armor and Motorized Infantry are restricted to 
main roads, the Spetsnaz and GRU elements can utilize light tactical vehicles, civilian 
vehicles, and/or rotary wing platforms to rapidly locate, isolate, and destroy resistance 
elements. Russian artillery units can fire conventional, cluster, anti-armor, localized EMP, 
and parachute EW rounds. Russian rocket launchers can fire conventional, localized EMP, 
parachute EW, and thermobaric rounds. Russian T-14 and T-15 vehicles have active 
defenses against anti-tank missiles and 35% can be optionally manned. Russian SOF light 
vehicles are extremely maneuverable, equipped with localized SIGINT capability. They 
have become proficient at radio direction finding and have mastered tipping/queuing TTPs 
with their organic ZALA drones that are capable of carrying a 20kg payload. 
2. Coalition 
2 x U.S. Army Special Forces ODAs are disaggregated: The U.S. Army Special 
Forces elements maintain the following force posture:  
• Equipped with highly maneuverable all-terrain vehicles with active 
protection; armed with rockets and SAMs though their ammunition stores 
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are nearly depleted. Vehicles hidden, rarely used as they are easily 
targeted if detected 
• Advanced communications equipment including stealth IP, and 
chameleon-like ability to hide in the noise to minimize jamming and DF 
• Limited additive manufacturing (3D printing) capability though raw 
materials are scarce 
Interagency elements: Present within Riga; however, minimal coordination and 
exact composition unknown 
 
Latvian SOF and Guerilla Fighters within the Riga Metropolitan Area: 300–500 
• Capable of massing up to 50 fighters 
Irregular defense group typically armed with small arms, antiarmor, anti-personnel 
mines, anti-tank mines, mortars, variety of small tactical transport vehicles and civilian 
vehicles. Increased engagement in the region with U.S. and NATO SOF since 2018 has 
enhanced their irregular war fighting capabilities and added new tools to their arsenals such 
as sensors, clandestine network formations (safe houses, caches, personnel recovery, 
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